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ABSTRACT
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-71, Trans-
mittal Memorandum No. I, requires that each agency establish a
management control process to assure that appropriate administrative,
physicv_ and technical safeguards are incorporated into all new
computer applications. In addition to security specifications, the
management control process should assure that the safeguards are
adequate for the application. This document examines the security
ac_ivitles that should be integral to the system development
process and the software quality assurance process to assure that
adequate and appropriate controls are incorporated into sensitive
applications. Security for software packages in also discussed.
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i. INTRODUCTION
Thq Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-?l,
Transmittal Memorandum (TM) No. I, dated 27 July 1978, requires
each agency to develop and implement a computer security
program. One of the specific requirements of 0MB Circular A-71,
TM No. I is that each agency must establish a management control
process to assure that appropriate administrative, physical and
technical safeguards are incorporated into all new computer
applications. The objective of the management control process is
to assure that, in addition to the security specifications
(and/or security safeguards) meeting all applicable Federal
policies, regulations and standards, the security provisions must
be adequate for the application.
NASA has made significant progress in the development and
implementation of an agency-wide computer security program in
compliance with 0MB Circular A-71, TM No. i. NASA Management
Instruction (NM£) 2410.7, "Assuring the Security and Integrity of
NASA Data Processing" has been issued. Guidance to the NASA
Centers for the development and implementation of NASA Center
Computer Security Programs has been incorporated in NASA Handbook
(NHB) 2410.1, "Computer Resources Management." Additionally,
NASA Headquarters and the Centers have published guidelines in
the areas of certification of existing applications software,
computer security training, contingency planning and risk
management. One of the remaining areas where guidance is
required is assuring that appropriate attention is given to
security safeguards in the design, development and opez_tlons
phases of the software llfe cycle for both internally developed
and purchased application _oftware.
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I.I Back§round
Computer services must be protected not only from physical
threats such as damage and theft but also from internal
vulnerabllltles such as programming errors and misuse by
unauthorized users [1]. Inadequacies in the design and
operation of computer applications are a very frequent source
of harmful effects associated with _ _put_rs, and in most cases
the effort to improvf security should concentrate on the
applications systems. Security concerns should be an integral
part of the entire planning, development, and operation of a
computer applicatlon. Much of what needs to be done to improve
security is not clearly separable from what is needed to
improve the usefulness, reliability, effectiveness, and
efficiency of the computer application [2]. When system
developers, users and data processlngmana,_ment address the
security concerns as part of the software llfe cycle process,
there are a number of issues which should be reviewed.
1.2 Security Issues in the Software Development Life Cycle
The software development life cycle (SDLC) is a technique used
to divide the system development process into distinct phases
with formal managempnt contro] points placed between and during
each phase. The objectives in using an SDLC technique are
twofold: to provide a more structured managemen_ scheme for
controlling costs and schedules, and to ensure proper and
responsive communications channels among users, auditors,
hardware planning personnel, top management and the data
processing personnel responsible for developing the application
systems [3]. From a computer security perspective, the SDLC
technique, when combined with a software quality assurance
process, provides the structure to assure that rev." _w points
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are established to permit comruter securitj management
personnel to review a_ approve the design specifications and
the security tests as required by O_B Circular A-7!, TM No. 1
(rlgure i-i), While complying with 0MB policy is an Important
consideration, there are a number of other issues that h_ve not
been previously well-deflned that will ultimately dete_mlne
whether the mecurity safegu_ds incorporated i,_to applications
systems are operatlon_.lly effective. The issues that must bo
addressed during the planning, deelgn, development, testing,
integration, Implementatlo_ and operational stages of the
software llfe cycle are:
Is review and approval of security specifications and
system tests sufficient ro ensure that the safeguards
ar_ adequate and approprtate_ If not, what other
reviews and/or appzovals are necessary and where in the
SDLC should they be accomplished?
• What system develcpment life cycle and/or software
qual_y assurance actlvltles are required to ensure the
qual_y of application system security safeguards7
How visible should safeguard_ be in the application
code and the documentation? To the user, the
developer, the maintainers, auditors and potential
perpetrator?
NASA, llke most organizations, does not rely solely upon
internally or contractor-developed applications. A significant
amount of applicatlons software _ acquired commercially in
packaged form. Adaptations must be made to the system
development llfe cycle to facilitate packaged software. From a
security vlewpolnt, there is concern about how NASA can ensure
that packaged software includes the security safeguards that
are appropriate and adequate for the applications. This area
of packaged software suggests that there is an additional issue
that must be addressed:
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• What activities are required to ensure the Inclusion,
adequacy and appropriateness of security safeguards in
purchased/leased software packages7
1.2.1 Issue #1--Sufficiency of Review and Approval of
Security Specifications and Systems Tests
This issue focuses on the need or desirability of security
review points beyond or in addition to those required in
current OMB policy. Currently, OMB A-71, TM No. 1 requires
that security specifications should be approved prior to
programming and that system tests be approved prior to using
the system operationally. The concern associated with this
issue is that the system development llfe cycle approach
includes a number of activities that are accomplished before
the generation of specifications that ha_e _irect bearing on
the ultimate adequacy, appropriateness and effectiveness of
security safeguards The question could also be posed as to
whether the review and approval of specification should be
accomplished at th_ preliminary system specifications level or
at the detailed (program) specifications level. Some facets of
this issue are founded in the variety of terms and SDLC phases
used throughout the data processing industry as a whole.
Section 2 of this document discusses the SDLC activities, the
activities associated with the SDLC that pertain specifically
to thp area of security safeguards and the requirements for
review of security concerns throughout the SDLC.
1.2.2 Issue #2--What Activities Are Required To Assure the
Quality of Application System Security Safeguards7
This issue focuses on the concern that security safeguards,
sometimes referred to as internal controls, are most often
judged or evaluated in terms of effectiveness, adequacy or
appropriateness. The concern surrounding this Issue is that
unless the security safeguards that are resident in
applications softvare code are developed with quality as a
developmental criteria, they may have flaws that will allow the
safeguards to be bypassed or penetrated. Therefore, ,he cost
of loss that may be incurred from exploitatlon of a fiawed
safeguard will not only increase the cost to fix the flawed
software, but will probably exceed the cost to fix the flaw.
The cost to fix a software flaw has been well documented by
G.H. Myers and is estimated to be as much as two-and-one-half
times more costly to repair in the design, developmeut/test
phase and 36 times more courtly in the integration phase than if
found in the requirpments phase of the SDLC [4].
Section 3 of this document will address the areas of how
quality software is defined and achieved and how the concept of
quality is applied to the case of security safeguards.
1.2.3 Issue #3--How Visible Should Safesuards be in the
Application Code and Documentation?
This issue focuses on the requirements by various populations
(e.g., users, auditors, programmers, penetrators) to be able to
have access to the security safeguards as they appear in the
software code, both within the computer and in lis:_nga, and in
the various pieces of documentation. The concern is that in
some cases security safeguards need to be transparent to
certain populations so that performance and human engineering
attributes are not unnecessarily constrained. At the same
time, certain populations require relatively unconstrained or
unencumbered access to the safeguards to ensure that the
safeguards can be tested, reviewed, maintained, and audited.
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Section 4 of this document provides a dlscuasion of the
requlrements of the various contending populations and the
alternatives available for providing the level of vls_billty
that will meet moat of the requirements of the population.
1.2.4 Iss,:e #4--Security Safeguards in Packaged Software
This issue focuses on the concern that purchased/leased
software packages may not provide, or have sufficient
flexibility to prov de, security safeguards to meet the
security requirements of NASA applications, There is also a
concern that insufficient emphasis will be placed on the
planning, design, testing, and implementation of security
safeguards when acquisition of a software package is chosen in
lleu of In-house development.
Section 5 of this document provides a discussion of the
modifications that should be made to classic system development
llfe cycle and security activities when addretslng the area of
security safeguards in software packages.
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2. THE SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT LIFE CYCLE AND SECURITY
Uhile it is common practice for systems developers to think of
system functionality first and to delay security concerns until
later, many opportunities to include effective controls are lost
if not considered early [2]. To assure that system developers
consider security throughout the software development life cycle
(SDLC), OMB A-71, TM No. i requires the establishment of a
management control process to assure that appropriate and
adequate controls are incorporated into all applications.
2.1 OMB Circular A-71, Transmittal Memorandum No. 1
Requirements for Applications Software Security
OMB Circular A-71, TM No. I states that the head of each
executive branch department and agency is responsible for
assuring an adequate level of security for all agency data
whether processed in-house or commercially. This includes
responsibility for the establishment of physlca],
administrative, and technical safeguards required to adeql_tely
protect personal, proprietary or other sensitive data not
subject to national security regulations, as well as national
security data. It also includes responsibility for assuring
that automated processes operate effectively and accurately.
...In consideration of problems which have been identified in
relation to existing practices, each agency's computer security
program shall at a minimum: ...Establish a mana_ ment control
process to assure that appropriate administrative, physical and
technical safeguards are incorporated into all new computer
applications and slgnlflcant modifications to exlstlng computer
applications. This control process should evaluate the
_nsitivity of each application. For sensitive applications,
parL:cularly those which process sensitive data or which
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have a high potential for loss, such as automated declslonmaklng
systems, specific controls should, at a minimum, include
reponslbllities for: (I) Defining and approving security
specifications prior to programming the applications or
changes. The views and recommendations of the computer user
organization, the computer installation and the individual
responsible for security of the computer installation shall be
sought and considered pr!or to the approval of the security
specifications for the application. (2) Conducting and
approving design reviews and application systems tests prior to
using the systems operationally. The objective of the design
reviews shoLld be to ascertain that the proposed design meets
the approved security specifications. The objective of the
system tests should be to verify that the planned
administrative, physical and technical security requirements are
operationally adequate prior to use of the system. The results
of the des_6n review and system test shall be fully documented
and maintained as part of the official records of the agency.
Upon completion of the system test, an official of the agency
shall certify that the system meets the documented a_d approved
security specifications, meets all applicable Federal policies,
regulations and standards, and that the results of the test
demonstrate that the security provisions are adequate for the
application.
While the terminology used within OMB Circular A-71, TM No. 1 is
not consistent with respect to the terms requirements, design
and specifications, it is clear that the intent of the overall
requirement for a management control process for the security of
computer applications software is directed at ensuring that
steps are taken to include security concerns and safeguards as
an intezral, albeit identifiable, part of the software
development life cycle process.
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2.2 The Software Dcvelopment Life Cycle
As noted previously, the software development life cycle (SDLC)
is a technique used to divide the system development process
into distinct phases. Figure 2-1 shows some 15 different
software llfe cycle models. None of these models uses exactly
the seme teralnology for all phases in the cycle. However it Is
important to note ...the management structure represented by the
models is a proven method for enabling a project manager to:
(I) estimate the cost/tlme to couplete a system or software
project; (2) make use of existing industry and government
standards and guldellnes; (3) assess the progress of a project
at discrete points in the llfe cycle by conducting _ormal
reviews and audlts; aud, (4) control system development by
requiring go/no-go declslon points throughout the llfe cycle [5].
Figure 2-2 presents a generic llfe cycle which is based upon the
model presented in the National Bureau of Standards PIPS PUBs 38
and 64 [6,7]. The basic software llfe cycle, as depicted,
Identifies three major phases: initiation, development and
operation. The development phase is divided into four stages:
definition, design , programming and test. For the purpose of
this document_ the operations phase has been divided into two
stages: Implementation and maintenance.
2.2.1 The Inltlatlon Phase
During the Initiation Phase, the objectives and general
definitions of the requirements are established. First, there
is an initial user definition activity. During thls activity
there Is a determination of what's currently being done; what
needs to be done; understanding the problem; de_Inlug of the
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scope, objectives and operating environment; definition of
functional, performance, and methodological requirements; and,
acceptance criteria.
The second activity conducted dt_rlng the Initiation Phase is
evaluation and inltlatlon of necessary documents to formally
commence the soltware development project. This activity
Includes performing a comprehensive study of technical,
operational and ecoLomic feasibility; performance of a
cost/benefit analysis; analysis of general design approaches,
and generating a development plan.
Documentation produced during the Initiation Phase requires user
involvement to define the project and its worth. Typically, a
Project Request Document is developed as a means for the user
organization to request the development, procurement or
modification of software or other ADP-related services. It
serves as the initiating document in the software llfe cycle,
and provides a basis for communicating with the requesting
organization to further analyze requirements and assess
impacts. The second document produced %_ usually the
Feasibility Study Document. The purpose of this document is to
provide: (1) an analysis of the objectives, requirements and
system concepts; (2) an evaluation of alternative approaches for
reasonably achieving the objectives; and (3) identification of a
proposed approach. The third document, Cost/Beneflt Analysis
provides managers, users, designers and auditors with adequate
cost and benefit information to analyze and evaluate alternative
approaches.
All documentation is widely reviewed and is followed by a
management decision of whether to continue on to the
2-6
Definition Stage. For external procurements, a Request for
Proposal (RFP) is issued, proposals are evaluated and a contract
is awarded.
2.2.2 The Development Phase
During the Development Phase, the requirements for software are
det_rmined and the software is then defined, specified,
programmed and tested. The Development Phase is broken down
into four stages: Definltlcn, Design, Programming and Test.
2.2.2.1 The Definition Stage
The activities during the Definition Stage include: translation
of the user requirements into detailed function requirements and
a functional architecture defining the operating environment,
functional modules, inputs, outputs, processing requirements and
system performance requirements (as needed to meet user
performance requirements); definition of data requirements;
completion of a general top-level design; definition of
functional interfaces (man/machlne, system/system,
functlon/function); identlflcation of required equipment; and,
planning for development activities. Documents typically
produced during the Definition Stage include the Functional
Requirements Document and the Data Requirements Document.
2.2.2.2 The Design Stage
During the Design Stage, the Systems and Program Specifications
are developed. Activities at this point include: designing the
system to meet functional requirements; dividing functional
modules into program modules identifying the inputs, processing
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and outputs of each; definition of the control and data
structure8 and protocols; and, specification of _nterfaces in
detail. Documents typically produced duriug this stage i_clude
the System/Subsystem Specifications, Program _eclftca_ions,
Data Base Specifications and the Test Plan.
2.2.2.3 The Prosrammln_ Stage
During the Programming Stage, the software is coded and
debugged. Activities may include obtaining of the required
hardware; writing, testing and debugging of software programs;
preparation of manuals; and, completion of test procedures.
Documentation typically produced during the Programming Stage
includes the Users Manual, Operations Manual, Program
Maintenance Manual and the Test Plan.
2.2.2.4 The Test Sta_e
During the Test Stage the software is tested and the related
documentation is reviewed. The software and documentation are
evaluated in terms of readiness for implementation. Activities
include: performance of integration and acceptance testing;
training of users and operators; installation in the operational
environment; data base conversion; and testing Ir the
operational environment. Documentation produced during this
stage is the Test Analysis Report.
2.2.3 The Operations Phase
During the Operations Phase, software is maintained and etthanced
as additional requirements are identified. The Operations Phase
can be viewed as two distinct stages: Implementation and
Malnte_ance.
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and efficiency of computer applications [2]. While security
concerns should be integrated in the llfe cycle of a computer
application, the steps taken to ensure the appropriateness,
adequacy and reasonableness of security saleguards should be
separately idet_Ifiable actlvltle• within each •tags or phase
of the SDLC.
2.3.,1 Security Activities
System planners, developers and user• should accomplish a
serle• of •ecurlty-related action• throughout the SDLC. While
the order in which the actions should be accomplished 18
presented sequentially, it should be recognized that there will
be much interaction between a particular step and the preceding
steps. The process for incorporating security safeguards in an
application is not substantially different from the SDLC
activities identified in Section 2.2. It should also be noted
that if during development, any change occurs in a software
requirement or specification, the change must be reviewed to
determine if coincidental changes ate required in the •ecurlty
requirements or specifications.
The security activities (Figure 2-3) tc be completed throughout
the SDI,C are:
• Determine Sensitivity of Data/Appllcation
• Determine the Security Objective(s)
• Assess the Security Risks
• Conduct a Security Feasibility Study
• Define the Security Requirements
• Develop the Security Test Plan
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FIGURE 2-3
SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT LIFECYCLE SECURITY ACTIVITIES
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• Design Security Specifications
• Develop the Security Test Procedures
• Write Security Relevant Code
• Document Security Safeguards
• Conduct Security Test & Evaluation
• Write Security Test Analysis Report
• Prepare Security Certification Report
Much of the information provided in tbe description of the
security activities is presen.ed In PIPS PUB 73 [2]. The
information is incorporated herein to provide the reader with a
complete dlscusslcn.
2.3.1.1 Determine the Sensitivity of Data/Appllcatlon
The degree of sensitivity of an application system depends upon
the data it will process and/or the types of functions to be
accomplished by the software. For example, data may be
personal in nature, represent valuable tangible assets such as
hlgh-dollar value inventory or represent real dollars.
Application processes which perform critical operations may
include formulas or algorithms that must always be executed
exactly the same, such as engineering calculations or on-board
software for a space vehicle.
FIPS PUB 73, Section 2.3, provides categories of sensitive
systems with some examples of the types of applications that
would fall under each of the categories. The categories and
examples are:
Applications Providing General l>rocessln_ Support - The
primary concern is for accidents, errors and
ommlssions. Health, safety, welfare and lives may
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sdepend on the correctness of output from th<_se
applications. Thus Cats integrity, including integrity
of the software, is critical.
- Engineering calculations used in aircraft design
- Query systems that support health care declslonmaklug
- Automated wind tunnel control systems
- Simulation of the dispersion of toxic substances
Funds Disbursement t Accounting, Asset Management
Systems - These systems frequently involve personal or
other confidential data. In these applications,
deliberate and accidental acts are a major concern.
Data integrity is the major objective. Data
confidentiality may also be required.
- Payroll
- Financial accounting
- Procurement support
- Equipment inventory control
• General-Purpose Information Systems - The simultaneous
use by different user populations makes data
confidentiality crlt_cal as well as data integrity.
_te generality of such systems and their associated
security requirements also make it more difficult tc
design effective securlty controls.
- Generalized data management systems
- Centralized management information systems
Automated Decislonmaklng Systems - Manual review is
more dlfficult, so that errors made by the automated
systems are less likely to be detected before they lead
to serious harm. The major objective is rigorous data
integrity.
- Fully automated funds disbursement and accounting
systems
- Automated inventory reordering
- Automated scheduling for maintenance
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s Real-Time Cont I Systems - These systems have all the
security conce_ of auto_sted declslonmaking systems
plus a rlgcrous requirement for constant availability
and very rapid response times. Basic controls plus
automated fault detection, backup, and recovery in
conjunction with redundant hardware support may be
required.
- Alr traffic control
- NASA mission control
- Rapid transit system control
- Automated production control
Systems Affectln i National Securlt 7 or Well-Belng -
These systems must be protected against hostile acts by
unauthorized persons who have conslderable resources.
Data integrity, confldentlallty, and ADP availability
are all required plus techniques for formal development
and verification of controls in operating systems as
well as application systems.
- Military command and control
- Management of multilevel classified information
- Integrated electronic funds transfer
- Nuclear material control and accountability
Additional guidance on determining the sensitivity of the
data/appllcatlon can be found in NASA Handbook (NHB) 2410.1
[i0]. For the purposes of the NASA Computer Security Program,
a sensitive application is defined as the use of a computer
system for processing classified, proprietary, dollar
sensitive, time sensitive, or Privacy Act data. All other
computer system use, such as that for scientific, technical,
research, or development activity, may be considered as a
nonsensitlve application; however, this does not preclude such
uses as being designated a sensitive application if this will
provide necessary and useful controls. Designation of a test
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and mission control application as a sensitive appllcatlon is
within the prerogatlve of responsible personnel. For test and
mission control applications, it is recommended that security
measures be provided for as an element of mission or test
plans. This will allow any necessary security measures to be
tailored to specific test and mission needs in a manner that
provides a sound balance between requirements for controls and
for operational flexibility.
To assist In decerulnlng whether an application nay be
sensitive, NHB 2410.1 provides the following guidance. First,
careful exercise of Judgement is required in evaluating the
sensitivity of applications. In those instances where it is
not clear that an application Is sensitive, it is necessary to
weigh the intangible costs of potential loss against the cost
to protect the application If it is categorized as sensitive.
This type of cost-_eneflt analysis is especially critical in
evaluating research, development, test. snd mission control
applications. The possibility that applications are sensitive
only under certain conditions should not be overlooked. For
example, It could be useful to categorize unique mission
control applications as being sensitive only during _ specific
period of the mission.
Essentially, the objective of this step is to determine whether
or not the application or the data is sensitive. If the data
or application is sensitive, the rationale should be
documented. When reviewing the data, one should attempt to
Aetermtne the potential gain to persons fzom unauthorized
access to or use of the data or the application process. This
step should be accomplished by the owner or intended user in
concert with the application and/or DPI CSO.
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If the application is determined to be sensitive, the next step
in the process is to determine the security objective or
objectives.
2.3.1.2 Determine The Securlt F 0bJective(s)
There are two types of events that can have unwanted or
undesirable effects on sensitive data or applications;
adve_ _nt (deliberate) or inadvertent (accidental). The
advertent or inadvertent events may result in the modification,
destruction, or disclosure of data or a)_lications software
programs, or the unavailability of computing resources. A
useful approach for assuring that appropriate and adequate
safeguards are incorporated in sensitive applications is to
establish security objectives that, if achieved, will
reasonably mitigate advertent or inadvertent events. Genera]ly
speaking, five security objectives should satisfy all types of
events and effects: data integrity, application integrity,
data confidentiality, application confidentiality and ADP
availability.
Data Intesrity - The state that exists when
computerized data is the same as that in the source
documents or has been correctly computed from source
data and has not been exposed to accidental or
malicious alteration or destruction [2].
• Applications Integrity - The state that exists when the
source and object code are the same as originally
developed and certified/accredited or, have been
modified and tested in accordance with established
standards and procedures and recertified/reaccredited,
and have not been exposed to accidental or malicious
alteration or destruction.
Data Confidentiality - The state that exists when data
is held in confidence and is protected from
unauthorized disclosure [2].
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• Application Confidentiality - The state that exlata
when application source and object code and
documentation is held in confidence and is protected
from unauthorized disclosure.
ADP Availabllit_ - The state that exists when required
ADP servlces can be obtained _Ithln an acceptable
period of time [2].
Plgure 2-4 provides a 8ulde for determining sensitive
appllcatlon security objectives. First, determine the category
of sensitive application. Second, refer to Figure 2-4 and
determine the posslble securlty objective that may have to be
achieved. It should be noted that this Is a prellmlnary
determlnatlon. The assessment of risks and security
_easlbillty study may surface concorns or limltatlons that
would requlre a modification of the security objectives.
_lls step should be accomplished by the owner or intended user
In concert with the application and/or DPI CSO.
2.3.1.3 Assess the Security Risks
The types of controls that will ultimately be incorporated into
an application system should be determined based upon the
potential loss or harm that could be suffered if the data or
the appllcatlon were modified, destroyed or disclosed or is
caused to become unavailable due unauthorized or undesirable
events. FIPS PUB 102 [8] provides an introductory discussion
of the usefulness of risk analysis for assessing the risks to a
new application.
The primary purpose of rlsk analysis is to understand
the security problem by identifying security risks,
determining their magnitude, and identifying areas
where safeguards or controls are needed. It can also
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be used to determine how many resources to budget for
security and, with user inputs and pol_cy
requlrements, can provide the basis fcr choosing
system security requirements.
Rlsk analysis can also be useful in _'alldating
requirements. If requirements are deflned to the
functional safeguards level, risk analysis can be
used to determine whether the protection embodied in
the controls reduces expected loss to _n acceptable
level at acceptance cost.
In the initial assessment of ciak, the concern is for the
impact and frequency of major failures. The impact of r_Jor
failures can be described In any convenient terms--dollar value
of loss, extent of inconvenience or hardship, llves lost or
degree of dis_ptior, to the national security or a_ncy mission.
The impact of at least the following failures should be
assessed for each major body of information that is to be
processed by the proposed system [2].
s Inaccurate Data - Data (programs) could be corrupted
with errors, but the system continues to functlonwhile
producing erroneous outputs. Estimate the potential
impact of erroneous actions that might result assuming
only that the output of the ADP system is not so
obviously out of llne with reality that the errors
would be noticed. Consider both the impact of a few
very serious errors and the cumulative effect of many
small errors.
Falslfled Data - An individual could falslfy data in
order to gain some advantage. The falsifications may
be limited only by the fact that they are subtle enough
so they are not detected manually. Estimate the total
impact that could occur over an extended period of time.
• Disclosed Data - Sensitive data in the system becomes
available publicly or to certain individuals. The
unauthorized disclosure of data is not necessarily
discovered.
2-19
Lost Data or Application Software Code or
Documentation - Data, source co_e, object code or
documentation are destroyed or corrupted. Backup
versions are nonexistent or not usable, and the data
must be reconstructed manually or software code or
documentation mvst be rewritten. Estimate the impact
of losing the data, source code, object code or
documentation. If manual reconstruction is obviously
not feasible _nd if backup in depth is anticipated,
estimate the impact of using old version, inaccuracies,
and the temporary unavailability that would result
while recovering from an old copy on the assumption
that all current or recent backup copies have been
destroyed.
Unavailable Data Services - Estimate the impact if the
computer hardware or related equipment in the computer
facility (DPI) is disabled and the system Is not
available until it can be brought up in another
facillty.
An estimate of the impact of a major security failure is not
particularly meaningful without some estimate of how frequently
it might occur_ Unfortunately, during the initial planning for
am application system, it is difficult, if not impossible, to
estimate the frequency of a major failure by evaluating the
controls in place. However, it is possible to develop rough
estimates based upon experience with manual system activities
and by looking at the experience of failures or disruptions
with similar types of systems. FIPS PUB v3 [2] _rovldes the
following guidance:
If the proposed system is generally comparable to
other computer applications, then a major security
failure of the sort described above can be estimated
to occur once in a hundred years. This simple
estimate is based on the following llne of reasoning:
Available security controls (if they are properly
managed) can prevent major security failures from
reoccurrlng as frequently as once every 10 years.
On the other hand, any ADP system has several
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vulnerabllltles against which there is little
defense; most _ystems can be manipulated by any
one of several individuals who are in a position
of trust--proL_ammers, those responsible for
security, the computer operators, and others.
There _re enough instances of major security
failures In computer applications so that an
expected frequency of once in a thousand years is
very optimistic. The estimate of once in a
hundred years is only intended to be accurate
within an order of magnitude.
An alternate approach for estimating frequency is to use a low,
medium or high frequency rather than orders of magnitude. This
approach _en used as part of the Threat Team Analysis should
prov_e sufficie_ data to provide an assessment of the impact
of major failures.
A threat team is composed of key employees within an
organization who meet as a task force to search for threats and
vulnerabilities in a system and who create possible scenarios
for attacking the system. Use of such teams is based on the
premise that people in the best position to discover how to
beat the system are those who work with it every day. The
objective is _o capitalize on their knowledge. Threat analysis
unlocks this potential through the use of a moderator familiar
with computer abuse methods. The threat sessions seek a
symbiosis between the moderator's general knowledge of typical
schemes and the partlcipant_L' specific knowledge of data
processing operations and functional experience with the system
under evaluation [1]. The threat team/analysis approach has
been used successfully in NASA in the evaluation/certiflcation
of existing sensitive systems [12].
Actual threat scenario development is accomplished through a
series, usually two, informal team meetings. The first meeting
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should be scheduled for two to two and one-half }_ours. The
second meeting should last for one to two hours. At the
beginning of the fJrst meeting of the team, a basic set of
ground rules and background information must be given. The key
elements of this background are summarized in Figure 2-5 [ii].
The moderator should give a brief summary of the statistics of
computer abuse, an outline of major schemes that have been
perpetrsted against similar types of applications and how they
were accomplished (modus operandi). The objective is to "prime
the pump" and stimulate the participants in developing possible
attacks against their system.
Flip charts should be used to record the following information:
• What is being attacked or compromised in the system?
• What vulnerabilltles would permit the attack to be
accomplished?
• What methods or procedures would be utilized?
• What types of safeguards or controls could be used to
prevent or reduce loss?
• What is the likelihood that this scenario will work
(hlgb, medium, low)?
• What is the impact on the system or organization if the
scenario were successfully executed (order of magnitude
dollars, delays, etc.)? Note: Quantification of
impact while desirable is not mandatory.
One alternate approach is for each threat team participant to
keep notes, summarize each scenario and turn the notes over to
the moderator for summarizing. The summary would be reviewed
by each team member at the second meeting. Another
alternative, is for the moderator, or other designated person,
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1.
2.
3_
4.
5,
6.
7.
Introduction
Summary
Moderator's
Identification
Why this
Organizrtion?
Why these
Psrtlclpante?
Warning about
Secrecy
Schedule
The moderator is Introduced by a NASA
management cfflcisl. Participants have not
been informed in edvance of the subject of the
meeting. The offJclal tl,en leaves. The
meeting place should be around a large table in
a comfortable room, such as the board ruom
(thus giving status and approval to the
prcJect).
Tile objectives of the study are expla'ned; the
time frame and the responsibilities of the
participants are outl_n.d.
T_,e moderator should establish his position
within the group and define his own role, which
is that of a resource person. He knows a good
deal about computer abuse schemes in general,
but little about how this particular
organization operates.
Participants should be put at ease by explaining
that the _tudy Is simply a precautionary
excerlee; there is no reason to suspect an
on-golng perpetration.
Participants often wonder "why me" at
this stage. Again they must be reassured.
They have been selected for the study because
of their knowledge and experience; they are the
people who "really know how this business
works."
Participants are asked not to discuss the
subject or content of the meetings outside
the group.
The group will meet for several hours. A
transcript will be prepared and circulated for
changes. A second meeting of the same group is
scheduled in about one week, and a final report
cgrculated in the same fashion.
FIGURE 2-5
OUTLINE OF INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS
BY MODERATOR AT FIRST THREAT SESSION
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to act as a recorder, to keep a "transcript" of the meeting.
The transcript would then be reviewed by each participant after
each meeting and flealized as a consensus record.
The second meeting should be conducted within one to two weeks
after the initial session. The initial session provides a
"sensitizing _"of the participants. Between the two sessions,
participants can review the proposed system with some new
perspectives and will usually provide additional scenarios. At
the conclusion of the second meeting, conclusioPs about the
scenarios should be agreed upon by all participants. A report
of the sessions should be written. The report should be
closely held, distribution extremely limited and copies
protected.
Upon completion of the threat scenario analysis exercise, it is
suggested that the security objectives be reviewed to determine
if the preliminary security objectives are still valid. When
reviewing the security objectives, the following items should
be considered to ensure that major concerns about security have
been addressed [2].
Source data accurac_ - Will the data supplied to the
ADP system be accurate and complete enough to support
its intended uses without harmful side effects?
User identity verification - _an users of the systems
be adequately identified and authenticated so they can
be held accountable for their actions?
• Restricted interfaces - Are the user interfaces to the
system sufficiently restricted so that adequate
security is feasible?
• Separation of duties - Do the boundaries between ADP
and related manual activities provide maximum
separation of duties and independent review?
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• Facility security - Is the proposed processing facility
adequately s__cure?
The next step in the security llfe cycle is to determine the
types of controls that should be incorporated into the
applice ion that will achieve the security objectives.
2.3.1.4 Security Feasibility Study
The purpose of the security feasibility study is to determine
if controls are available to meet the security objectives, how
well they will satisfy the obJectlves_ whether the controls
should be preventice, detective or recuperative in nature and
what mix of administrative, physical and technical controls is
most feasible. Cost, performance degradation, and impact on
requirements for user friendliness should be considered. In
other words, what types of controls are appropriate for the
proposed application.
A key to the feasibility study is the use of an appropriate
methodology to analyze the proposed application to determine
what security controls are available and how well they meet the
security objectives. Brill, in "Building Controls lntc
Structured Systems" [13], divides applicatin controls into
three major classes: controls over inputs, controls over
processing and controls over output. Brill's methodology is
basud on a hierarchical approach that leads the user through a
tree structure to address a variety of control issues such as
input authorization, internal data movement, operator
intervention, and output distribution.
At this point in the llfe cycle with the determinatioD of
sensitivity completed, the identification of security
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objectives, the assessement of risks and security feasibility
completed, definition of security requirements is the next step.
2.3.1.5 Define Security Re_ulrelents
Definition of security requirements takes place during the
definition stage of the development phase of the 8ysten
development llfe cycle. The term "requirements" can be used at
many different levels. The requirements defined at this point
should include everything that the users and other responsible
parties want to require of the application software. The
security requirements should be expressed in a way that permits
the software designers to choose the best way of implementlng
them. It should be remembered that security controls can be
enforced either by software or by physical or administrative
procedures. For example, data integrity can be checked by
human review or by automated bounds and conslztency checks.
When possible, it is recommended that controls be implemented
in software for the followin 8 reasons: once controls have been
automated, the continuing cost to enforce the controls is
usually lower than when enforced mlnually, and, automated
controls will be applied more consistently.
It should be noted that FIPS PUB 73 [2] indicates that the
documentation of security requirements constitutes the security
specification called for in OMB Circular A-71, Transmittal
Memorandum No. i, paragraph 4.c (I). Also, security
specifications may be incorporated into the functional
requirements document and the data requirements document as
called for in FIPS PUB 38 [6], or it may be an independent
document.
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The first step in defining security requirements is to conduct
in awmlysls of the "current system" to identify and develop an
understanding of the principle functions and to identify
sources of input and the flow of data through the system. When
the current system is reasonably understood, the user and
system requirements should be documented. The sources of input
and the flow of data through the system are two of the most
important sources of data for defining security requirements.
Brill [13] indicates that systems analysts can use four
different sources to identify controls that belong in the new
system: stated user policy, unstated user pollcy, the current
system and external constraints.
Stated user pollcy--The best way to begin to
determine the controls needed in a system is to
ask the users about the need for controls. Users
have a genuine stake in the new system as well as
thorough knowledge of their own requirements.
Users should be asked how they handle errors in
the pr¢gent system, the kinds of errors or
problems they suspect they don't know about (that
Is, Those that are slipping through undetected).
Users should also be asked about laws or
regulations that affect the way system processes
must be done as well as questions about the value
and cri_Icallty of their data.
Unstated user policy--Users expect comprehensive
controls to be built into their system without
ever mentioning controls in discussions wlth the
analysis team. For example, the need to test
check digits on account numbers may never b:
stated because the present manu_l system may not
have facilities to permit it. But users may
assume that an automated system tests check digits
as P matter of course and that you don't need to
be told to build such tests into the system,
Systems plannsrs must learn the system--and
understand the problem--well enough to challenge
the unstated assumptions of the users and turn
unstated requirements into stated ones.
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• The current systenr--New systems tend to do many of
the same thlugs as the systems they replace. Of
course, they-my do them dlfferently (via a
terminal, for example, rather tha_ through
batch-produced reports). So, while the specific
controls in the new system "my differ from those
in the old system, there are goID_ to be
overlaps. But, you have to look for them, and
have to recognize them as controls and to assess
their 3ultability for transplantation into the new
system.
External constralnts--Varlous laws and regulations
can dlrectly affect a system. (This area would
include agency policy for security, financial
accounting, etc.)
FIPS PUB 73 [2] sugEests that the following areas be addressed
when developing secu_'Ity requirements: identification and
definition of systems interfaces (to include responsibilities
associated with each interface and a separation of duties),
identification of the sensitive objects to be processed,
determination of error tolerances and definition of
availability requirements.
Identification and definition of systems
Interfaces--ldentlfy each Job function which is
related to the application system. Consider each
Job function as an interface to the application.
Define the nature of the Inter_ctlon between each
Job function and the system. Also identify and
define any interfaces to other auto-mted systems.
Include all Job functions (or other automated
systems) that are to be supported by this
system--even if the people performing those Jobs
only receive reports from it. Also include all
Job functiors (or other automated systems) tha_
supply information to the application system or
that support its operation. Be sure to include
critical Job functions such as: source data
collection, input preparation, data entry, output
dissemination, data base ada/nistratlon, system
security planning and control, internal audit,
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application program maintenance, archival or
backup data storage , computer operation•, and
system programming.
Define the responsibilities of the individuals who
interact with the application system through each
defined interface. Identify the constraints on
the use of each interface that must be enforced if
security i• to he preserved. Consider the
likelihood of error• occurring in the use of the
interface and identify the consequences. Consider
the consequence• of deliberate misuse of the
interface. Identify the management and
administrative controls that will be available to
ensure that the interface i• used properly.
Examine interfaces to ensure that security
exposure will be minimized even if an interface is
misused. Ideally, any action that could result in
serious hara should be checked or approved from an
independent interface.
• Identification of sensitive objects to be
processed--Identlfy the objects to be
processed--include input data, stored data and
output data. Determine the sensitivity and asset
value of the data objects. Identify the
operations or functions that users will perform on
this data.
• Determination of error tolerances--Determlne the
application'• error tolerance by taking into
con•Ideratlon the expected reliability and
validity of the data and the intended objectives
of the application. For example, funds
disbursement or electronic funds transfer systems
may have a low tolerance for data error since such
errors directly translate into dollars. Real-tlme
control systems such as air traffic control have
virtually no margin for errc- since human lives
may be lost. Some management Informatlou systems,
particularly those used to predict future demands
and resource requirements, may not be as
susceptible to errors in data. However,
algorithms in the code may have less tolerance for
errors. The application's tolerance for error and
the requirements for maintain/ng error levels
within acceptable tolerance must be defined.
2-29
• Definition of availability requirements--Deterttne
the user tolerance for interruption of output data
and the potential harm that could be a result due
to non-availability of the application output.
The preceding discussion in tb!_ section has addressed the
collection and analysis of data t,mt precedes the actual
documentation of security requireuents. Requirements
should define what is required by the user not how it is
to be accomplished.
FIPS PUB 73 [2] describes some basic controls that can be
used to achieve security objectives. It is relevant at
this point in this discussion to summarize these basic
controls since the descriptions provided, wlth some
modification, can be used as security requirements. The
basic controls provided in FIPS PUB 73 are: data
validationj user _dentlty verification, authorization,
Journaling, variance detection, and encryption.
Data valldation--Invalld data umy lead to
erroneous outputs, can destroy the credibility of
the system_ demoralize those trying to use it,
cause excessive system meintenance costs, and, in
extreme cases, cause the system to become
unavallable or unusable.
Data validation involves the exaalnation of
computerized data to determine if it is accurate,
complete, consistent, unambiguous, and
reasonable. Direct evaJustion methods (discussed
below) are not able to find all errors. Data
integrity depends on the correctness and integrity
of all the activities by which the data is
collected and processed. Data validation is a
very basic control, but it should only be expected
to detect gross errors and it will not compensate
for poor control over other aspects of the
appllcatlon system. Data should be validated
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during data collection and entry--prlor to its use
by the system; and, continuously, as new data is
generated or used during processing.
Data validation should be required durlng data
entry and during processing. Automated editing
and valldatlon should be used in both batch and
on-llne systems. In batch processing systems,
validation routines may run against input data
before it is processed. Alternate!yj valldatlon
can occur as each transaction is processed.
Transactions that contain errors should be
recorded on a file for correction at a later
time. 0n-llne systems can provide the da_a entry
personnel with Immedlate validation information so
detected errors can be corrected immediately.
During the definition stage the editing and
validation technique to be employed is not
specified, rather the requirement should state
that all data originating from hard copy should be
validated prior to the transaction beln@ entered
into the system.
For a batch system a typical requirem_T t statelent might read:
All source data will be keyed twice and automatically
compared with the transcribed source data prevfously
keyed.
For an on-llne system where transactions are entered zn
real-tlme_ a typical security requirement might read:
All keyed transactions (or transactions of a certain type)
will be visually verified prior to transa_sslon to the
systel.
Data may also be validated during processing. Moat of the
techniques that are approprlate to validation during data entry
may be appl!ed during processing. An example of a requirement
that related to validation during processing is:
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Transaction with error• detected during the data
processing phase need to be controlled to ensure they are
corrected and reentered in a timely phase.
User identity verlfication--ldentlflcatlon occurs when
the user provides an identlfier-the name by which the
user i• known to the system. The user's identifier i•
unique, unlikely to change and need not be kept
secret. It i• used during processing fcr authorization
control•, variance detection and for other purpose such
a• accounting and billing. Verification occurs when
the individual passes some further test which "proves"
that the user is actually the per•on a••oclated with
the identifier. This i• also called user
authentication.
Example• of requirement• for user identification and/or
verification might be a• follow•:
For batch submission•, user• must be visually identified
by a control clerk and all Jobs logged.
For on-llne submission of transactions, all users must
have an individual identifier and password for initial
logging on.
Authorlzation--Once a user's identity has been
verified, the application may still need to check each
request for service to determine whether it is a
legitimate request by that user. Some users may be
authorized to perfo,rm some functions but not others and
to have access to perform some functions but not others
and to have access to some data but not to other data.
In some cases, the authorization decision may depend on
not only WHO is requesting what MODE OF ACCESS to which
OBJECT, but also on other easily testable conditions.
The time of day, the day of the week, previously
detected security variances, or other concurrent
activity might be used to affect the authorization
decision.
An example of this type of authorization when stated as a
security requirement might read:
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The system must be able to restrict update access to
specific tile of the day and days of the week.
Journaling--Journals may be employed to log activities
or events external to the operational environment or
those internal to the application system. Journals of
external events in the operational environment can be
maintained manually while Journals used to record
activities internal to the application _dst be
automated. From a security standpoint, the ideal
Journal would include _ 100 percent recording of all
events relating to data, software, and system
resources. From a practical standpoint, such a Journal
may, in some systems, be ol_t of the question since the
overhead to record all events would reduce system
response to less than acceptable levels of
performance. Requirements for Journaling should be
carefully considered, reduced to formal statements and
be stated in positive terms. Items that should be
Included are:
- definitions of what kind of data is to be protected
and how the system will recognize such data,
- the deers3 of accuracy that is necessary for various
types of data, and
the definition of who is authorized to access
protected data and how the system would recognize an
authorized user.
Examp.,-s of a security requirement for Jourualing are:
The system will log all accesses by payroll personnel to
any employee's payroll record. The system will log all
initial log-ons, final log-off at the end of the normal
work day and all log-ons and log-offs on weeken6s.
The system will log all opening and closings of the
payroll master file and payroll transaction up%ate files.
Variance detection--The objective of variance detection
is to allow management to detect and react to
departures from established rules and procedures that
it l_s determined may constitute hazards. Variance
detection acts as a strong deterrent to authorized
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users abusing their privileges since they perceive the
risk of detection to be unacceptably high. Variance
detection is useful whenever it is not practical to
prevent the undesirable activity by_aas of an
authorization mechanism. In some cases, there may be
no way to determine in advance whether an action should
be prevented. _e mechanisms required to support
variance detection are related to mechanisms needed for
other purposes. Recovery, accounting, load-balanclng,
tuning and the ideutlflcatlon of recurring user
difficulties all require some of the same capabilities.
A security requlreme_ts for variance detection mlght read:
The system must be capable of providing post-processlng
analysis of all or selected activity initiated from a
given terminal or by a given employee.
The system must provide an interaction capability to
identify attempted accesses to restricted files by
unauthorized users.
The preceding are examples of static monitoring. Some
variances can and should be detected in real-tlme so that
responses can be immediate. An example of a dynamic monitoring
requirement might read:
The system must be capable of real-time display at a
designated console of the full interactive traffic of any
terminal or user.
m Encryptlon--The applications that are most likely to
need encrypt$on are those that transmit highly
confidential data across communication lines.
Applications that transmit financial transactions or
other critical data may also need encryption if some is
likely to derive enough benefit from modlfyln_ _he data
during transmission to compensate for the risk and cost
of the effort. Encryption of data in storage is an
alternative that may be more cost effective than other
storage securi_f controls--especially when appropriate
support for encryption is readily available.
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A security requirement for encryption might resd:
All data transmitted between the hose computer and remote
site will be protected from unauthorized disclosure and
modification during transmission.
Following the definition of security requirements, two
activities ehould be initiated: development of the test plan
and the design of the security specifications. While they are
shown in Figure 2-3 as sequential events, they can be
accomplished in parallel since two different groups of people
are Involved.
2.3.1.6 Develop the Security Test Plan
Testing and evaluation attempts to demonstrate that a system is
reliable, meets specifications, and meets the requirements of
the user. Sorkowitz [14] provides the following comments on
testing:
The main problem in program testing becomes clear
when we try to define the word "testlnE." To many
programmers, testing is a process of proving that a
program is correct Ci.e., the program performs
according to specification). However, experience
leads us to the belief that there really is no
practlcal way to demonstrate that a program is
correct. The best we can say is that at some point
in time, there are no known errors. Myers [4] gives
a different definition of testing: "Testing is the
process of executing a program with the intention of
finding errors."
Carefu/ and thorough testing and evaluation can improve system
security by uncovering errors, omissions and other flabs in the
system's design and code [2]. From a security perspective, the
testing of security controls should focus on ensurin& that
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security controls are invoked when required, tlmt they cannot
be easily bypassed, that they are audltable and that they are
appropriate in view of the sensitivity of the data or the
application.
The test plan for security should describe what i6 to be
tested, the testing schedule, resource requlrenents, testing
materials, requirements for test training, the location of the
test, the functional security requirements, the tests to be
performed on the software and their relationship to the
functional security requirements, the testing methodology, the
evaluation criteria, data reduction techniques and a
description of each test to be performed. The test plan format
provided in FIPS PUB 38 [6], with sllght modification, can be
used to develop the security test plan. A suggested test plan
format Is provided in Appendix A.
At this point In the system development life cycle, only
portions of the test plan can be deceloped. If the format at
Appendix A is utilized, the following sections can be generated
at thls time. Section I, General Information, can be
completed. In Section 2, Plan, the software description can be
written; tentative milestones can be developed; and,
prel_minary development of the testing subsection can be
started. One of the _rltlcal items in Section 2 is the area of
test training. Speci_ic_lly, the types of training for the
test team should be identllied as soon as possible. In
Section 3, under Specifications and Evaluation, the functional
security requirements and the security functions to be tested
can be identified. Additional portions of the test plan wlll
not be able to be developed untll such time as the
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system/subsystemspeclflcations, program specifications, data
base specifications and security specifications have been
generated.
One of the ma_or objectives of the s_curlty test and evaluation
of an application under development is to provide some of the
data to suppurt the certificaclon of the security controls as
required by OMB Circular A-71, Transmittal Memorandum No. i.
FIPS PUB 102, Guideline for Computer Security Certification and
_ccreditatlon [8], describes how to establish and carry out a
certification and accreditation program for computer securlty_
FIPS PUB 102 also provides some guidance that Is useful in
developing security test plans. It should be noted that in the
NASA environment a different set of terminology is used _n the
area of certification and accreditation. In NASA, the term
avaluatlon is used to identify the technical evaluation of the
security of an application (synonymous with the FIPS PUB 102
term certification), and certification is used to identify the
official management authorization for operation of the
application (synonymous with the FIPS _UB 102 term
_ccredltatlon).
FIPS PUB 102 defines the certification (evaluation) process as
consisting of five activities: planning, data collection,
basic evaluation, detailed evaluation, and report of findings.
The process is summarized in Figure 2-6. The certification
(evaluation) process Js an iterative process. That is, based
on findings from each stage, previous states might have to be
reentered and work performed over. For example, basic
evaluation might identify a function chat is not included
within evaluation boundaries but is important for security.
This can re0uire revision of the bo,mdarles defined during
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planning, along with additional data collection. The work is
not sequential as suggested in the figure. Typically, most or
all stages are ongoing at the same time. The intent of the
figure is to show the shift in emphasis as work progresses.
It should be noted that basic evaluation or general evaluation
is the minimum necessary for certification (evaluation) to take
place. In general, basic evaluation suffices for most aspects
of an application under review. However, most certifications
(evaluation) also require detailed work in problem areas, and
therefore require detailed evaluation as well. (For NASA,
security te_ts are considered to be a detailed evaluation.)
Minimum products required for certification and accreditation
are a security evaluation report and an accreditation report.
2.3.1.7 Desl_n the Security Specifications
The design stage is the time to make detailed decisions about
how the security requirements wil] be implemented. There are
usually a variety of ways to achieve an adequate level of
security. In designing security controls, the age-old maxim of
"Keep It Simple" is most applicable. A primary source of
security problems is excessively complex design that cannot be
implemented easily or correctly, and cannot be maintained nor
audited. Lonsonsky [15] and Wong [16] suggest that, for any
sensitive applicstioD, a thorough risk analysis, including
safeguard selection, should be performed at the beginning of
the design phase to assure that appropriate cost-effective
controls are integral to the system's design. The guidance in
FIPS PUB 65 [17] can be tailored for a risk snalysis of an
application system design [2] FIPS PUB 73 [2] provides some
ideas that apply to the overall security design effort.
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UnnecessaryProgramming. Terminals should be
interfaced with the application system so as to
mln_mlze the danger that users can get unneeded
programming capability. Users who can execute
their own programs usually have the potential to
bypass any security controls.
Restricted User Interfaces. User interfaces
should be tailored as specifically as possible to
fulfill the user's requirements. Unneeded
flexibility makes it more difficult to trein users
and to get them to accept the system. Flexibility
also hurts security. _le greatest danger occurs
•_hen users are given unnecessary access to a
general purpose programming language; ...Once the
user's needs are understood, interfaces should be
designed to meet these needs as simply as possible
with no unnecessary capabilities that complicate
things both for the users and for the security
analyst.
Human Engineering. To preserve security and
integrity, user interfaces must be designed so
they are easy to understand and use. This can
foresta_l many user errors, and it decreases the
chances that users will neglect or bypass controls
which they view as cumbersome and annoying.
• Shared Computer Facilities. It is easier to
protect the code and data of the application
system if it does not share compvter facilities
with other applications. It is especially useful
to exclude all program development activltles from
the machine that runs the appllcatlon-lncludlng
the development and maintenance of the
applicatlou's programs themselves.
• Isolation of Critical Code. The code and system
data that is critical to security should be well
identified so it can be more easily audited and
protected. When possible, security controls
should be isolsted in modules that have few
interactions with the rest of the application
software. This makes it easier to audit these
modules and protect them from unauthorized
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modifications during operations. Sometimes
automated controls can be used to protect these
modules:
* Checksums of the object code can be used to try
to detect unauthorized changes.
* Hardware protection states or protection
do_ains can protect code and data critical to
cecurity.
If security-critical code always resides in a
fixed area of memory, then read-only memory can
be used.
Recent experimental !an_n_ages, called typ_ safe
Languages, may soon be available. Compilers
for these languages can protect modules and
their data from unexpected interactions with
other modules.
Identification and partial isolation of critical
code and data are reasonably easy; however,
rigorous isolation is more difficult than it
sounds. Without very careful planning, all system
code and data will end up being relevant to
security because errors or deliberate traps
elsewhere can still cause security failures. This
other software includes:
* The operating system and other software that
supports any of the se_-rlty functions.
All parts of the application system needed to
guarantee that the _ecurlty controls are
invoked at the appropriate time.
Compilers and other software used to develop
•nd maintain any securlty-relevant software.
When code relevant to security Is rigorously
i8olsted from the bulk of the software, it i8
called a secu=ity kernel. Security kernels that
protect data from unauthorized disclosure are
feasible, but they require specially designed
operating systems.
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@ Backup and Recovery. Wlth appropriate contingency
planning, the services of a computer application
can usually be restored wlthln a few hour= after m
failure. If availability requirements are lore
rigorous than thatp then automatic backup and
recovery mechanisms say need to be included in the
application software.
• Use of Available Controls. The operat n8 system
and the facility management may already p, >vlde a
variety of coutrols such as:
* User identity verification.
* Authorization for a_cess to systea files.
* Journaling of operating system activities.
* Backup and recovery operations.
Whlle the application system usually needs to
supplement these controls, available controls
should be used to the fullest extent possible. In
too many cases, controls are needlessly
relmplemented because controls tb_t are available
are not understood or not utilized.
Since the security controls of an operating system
are not absolutely reliable, the application
system should use some data integrity checks to
try to Identify whether crltlcal data has been
altered; however, in general, there is no reason
to believe that controls ImpleQented in the
applicatlonwi!l be any more rellable than those
already provided hy an operating _ystem.
The purpose of She design stage is :o translate the security
functlonel requirements into security specifications that can
be used by programmers to develop the securlty-relevant code.
D_ceeman [18] offers the followlng comments on the purpose of
technical design.
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...three basic purposes of d_slgn can be discerned...:
- discovery of problem structure;
- creation of the outlines (architecture, logical
structure) of a solution for the problem;
- review of the results to ascertain if they meet
the stated goals.
Once we understand the problem, the next major step
is to develop outlines of the solution. This is the
creative aspect of design in the strict sense of the
word, although developln 8 an accurate understanding
of the problem requires Just as much creativity in
many cases.
The major activity is the establishment of the
architecture of the system. That is, we engage in a
combination of spelling out, in general terms, how
the artifact will look to the user--the functions it
will perform--and how it will be built--the major
algorithms and data representations it will use.
Some parts of this proces_ of spelling out the
overall _tructure may require that we extend the
design to a very detailed level in order to determine
the feasibility of performing certain functions.
But, in general, we are establishing the major pieces
of the system, their relationships, interfaces to
other systems and the outside world, and carefully
sp_clfylng what must be done along with rough
indications of how it is to be done.
The third purpose of design is to review repeatedly
what has been done so far, to compare it to what is
desired, and thus to evaluate progress. Review takes
place at all atages of the development cycle, of
course, but it is most central to the design phase.
Review cf code production is intended to determine
that what has been ImpleQented is what was specified;
review of test re_Its is meant to confirm that a
sufficient set of tests has been run; r_vlew of
specifications seeks to deterLine if the loosely
stated requirements of the customer have been
captured in operational terms. Review at the design
phase, though, goes beyond Juet determining if
scmethin8 that _s been previously spelled out has
2-43
been done--it is an integral part of the process of
discovering the nature of the problem and the proper
structure of the solution.
Freeman goes on to describe the software lifecycle as
consisting of six stages: analysis, functional specification,
arahitectural deRign, detailed design, implementation and
evolution. Freeman's analysis ok _he development process,
particularly the architectural design and detailed design are
appropriate to understanding how to develop specifications for
security requirements.
...For each stage, we will list the primary inputs (I),
outputs (0), and major operations (OP)...
Architectural Desi_u
I=
O=
OP:
speclficatio_s, general context of desired system,
knowledge of similar systems
structural description of inside of system
(definition of modules and interfaces)
discovery of problem structure, identification of
major pieces of system, establishment of
relationships between parts, abstraction,
decomposition
Detailed Design
I:
O:
OP:
architectural description, programming environment
details
blueprints for programs
abstraction, elaboration, choice of alternatives
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In developing security specifications, there should be s normal
evolution from architectural specifications to design
specifications. Whether there will be an explicit distinction
between archltectural-type specifications an, _ detailed
specifications will depend on each organization's or Center's
standards for software llfe cycle development. It should be
noted that the terms logical design and physical design, used
in some methodologies, correspond to SDLC architectural design
and detailed design, respectively.
In Section 2.3.1.5, examples of security requirements were
provided based on the basic controls described in FIPS PUB
73 [2]. The types of basic controls included: data
validation, user identity verification, authorization,
Journallng, variance detection, and encryption. The following
discussion will provide examples of specifications for some of
the security requirements previously discussed.
Requirement - All source data will be keyed twice
and automatically compared with the transcribed
source data previously keyed.
Specification - A second person will key the data
into a verifier. Only those fields containing
transaction code, employee name, SSN, and grade
will be verified. Any record containing a
discrepancy between the initial keying and the
verifying keying will be recorded on a discrepancy
file. The discrepancy file will be forwarded to
the input control group. Each record containing
an error will be visually compared to the original
source document and the input control group will
resolve any discrepancy. The corrected
transaction record will then be submitted input to
the system.
(The operations manual would indicate the record
positions of the fields to be verified and the
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specific instructions for incorporating the
correct record/transactlon into the batchlng
process.)
$ Requirement - All keyed transactions (or
transaction of a certain type) will be visually
verified prior to transmission to the system.
• Specification - Data entry personnel will visually
verify that the transaction code is equal to a i,
2, or 3; the name fleld contains no arabic numeric
data (note romanic number such as I, If, III,
etc., are legal); the SSN fleld contains no alpha
or special characters, no blanks; and that the
grade _leld contains no alpha, special characters
or blanks; that grade field contaIDs only one of
the following: 01, 03, 04, 05, 07, 09, 10, U.
13, or 14.
If any field is not correct, the operator wi_
check the source document for the correct data.
If the source document is in error, the document
will be returned to the point of origination for
correction and resubmlsslon.
• Requirement - All data transmitted between the
host computer and remote site will be protected
from unauthorized disclosure and modification
during transmigslon.
Specification - All data will be encrypted using
the Data Encryptlon Standard as specified in FIPS
PUB 46.
After the security specifications have been developed and
approved, the development of test procedures can begin.
2.3.1.8 Develop Securlt Z Test Procedures
At this point in the llfe cycle, following the definition of
the sec_city specifications, Section 3 and 4 of the Security
Test Plan can be developed_ Using the test plan format at
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Appendix A, the next step is to complete the sections dealing
with methods and constraints and evaluation.
The methodology should indicate whether static or dynamic
testing or both will be used, whether llve or test data and an
indication of the volume of data that is required to adequately
test the security controls. The method for recording test
results shc_uld be identified as well as any constraints that
may limit the scope of the test. Under the evaluation section,
the criteria for each type of test should be identified. Data
reduction methods should also be described.
FIPS PUB 73 [2] offers some guidance on static and dynamic
testing that is useful to this discussion of developing
test procedures.
Static Evaluation. These techniques, which involve
examination and analysis of the systems documentation and
code, represeut the most effective way to detect
deliberate traps or other unauthorized modifications.
However, due to the complexity of most systems and the
limitations of automated techniques, and tools, it is not
currently practical to analyze systems completely using
static evaluation methods. In addition, static evaluation
does not examine the system in a "llve" or operational
mode so that errors .n the execution environment are not
detected. Specific techniques and tools include:
Code Review. Portions of the source code are evaluated
to determine if they implement _he design
specifications and are free from errors. In most
cases, it will be impossible to review all of the
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system's code. Generally, samples of code will be
revlewed--especlally critlcal modules or crltical
portions of the code. The code review can be done by
an internal test and evaluation team that is involved
in the system development or by an independent (third
pa_ty) team _ItLer lnternal or external to the
organization. Code review differs fcom peer review,
...in that the code review is performed by individuals
who were not involved with the design and programming
of the application.
Penetration Studies. A few individ,mls can be
challenged to find unknown weaknesses in the security
controls. Penetration studies to Identify prozra_rtng
errors can be expensive and are useful only if someone
believes that there are no remlnlng errors that can
affect security.
Source Code Analyzers. These software tools aid the
evaluation process by providing details about specific
characteristics of the source program.
Examples include:
cross reference listings are an aid to code
review and may be useful to identify "suspicious"
variables and source statement references.
the variables which can influence control flow
decisions can all be identified or variables
which could be read before any value has been
assigned to them can be identified.
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Dynamic Testing. These tec,hniques involve e_.catiag the
application system, or portions of the system, Kith test
data and comparing the actual results with expected or
known results .... Dynamic testing is only practical for
selected test cases. Fundamental questions such as,
"Which test cases should be chosen?" and "How s any test
cases are enough?" must be answered. The answers to these
questions "epend upon the eystcm being tested ann upon the
experience of the test team.
The following tools can be used to aid the dynamic testing
process:
ProgranAnalyzers. A program analyzer is a computer
program that collects data about another program'A
operation while that program is executing. Program
analyzers can be particularly useful for evaluating how
thoroughly the test data has elercised the program
being tested. In addition, they can be used co
Identify extraneous code that might be an unauthorized
insertion.
Flaw Hypothesis Method. Security fl&ws can be
hypothesized based on analogous flaws found in other
systems and then tested for existence in this system.
This is an effective approach for selecting test cades
that are likely to find flaws.
The following excelpts for FIPS PUB %02 [8] on basic and
detailed evaluation provide guidance that should be useful in
developing test procedures.
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._.The general distinction between basic and detailed
evaluation is that basle evaluation is primarily concerned
with the overall functlonal security posture, not with the
specific quality of individual controls .... Basic
evaluatio_ is also concer%ed with verifying that security
functions actually exlst and that the implementation
method is of sufficient quality to be relied upon.
Detailed evaluation, on the other hand, is concerned with
whether security functions work properly, satisfy
performance criteria, and acceptably resist penetration.
_,ere are four tasks in basic evaluation:
I. security requirements evaluation (are application
security requirements acceptable?)
2. security function evaluation (do application
security functions satisfy requlrementsT)
3. control existence determination (do the security
functions exist?)
. methodology review (does the implementation method
provide assurance that security functlo.s are
acceptably implemented?)
Security Requirements Evaluation In both formulating and
evaluating security requirements for ar application, two
classes of needs are considered: policy needs and
situational needs. Policy needs derive from the
princiFles and required practices that the application is
obliged to pursue, such as Federal laws, regulations,
seandards and agency policies. Situational meeds are
those derivlng fro_ the application's characteristics and
environment. To determine situational needs, fou2 primary
areas are considered: assets, threats, exposure and
controls.
i. Asset. What should be protected?
2. Threats. What are assets being protected against?
3. Exposures. What might happen to assets if a threat
is realized7
4. Controls. How effective are security safeguards in
reducing exposures?
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Security Function Evaluation. Given well-deflned security
requirement=, function evaluation becomes the most
important task in basic evaluation. It determines whether
security functions (control techniques) such a
authentication, authorization, monitoring, security
management, and security labeling satisfy security
requirements. The p_im_ry method is simply to use the
stated requirements as a checklist to follow in assessing
whether they are satisfied.
In some cases, requirements specify only the need for
generic functions such as authentication. In other cases
the requirements call for use of specific mechanism, such
as particular password technique. In bott: situations,
f.mction evaluation identlfies the defined security
function and examines it for acceptability.
An important concern for function evaluation is the
appropriate level of detail. The recommendation is that
basic evaluations be complete (all applicable control
features) down through the functional level, where
"functional level" is the logical level represented by
functions as defined in (or appropriate for definition) in
the Functional Requirements Document. This notion applies
to both controls within the computer and physical/
adml_istrative controls external to it (although =he
latter might not actually be defined in a Functional
Requirements Document).
Control Existence Determination. The fact that functions
are described in a document or discussed in an interview
does not prove that they have been Implemented. Basic
evaluations require assurance that security function
controls exist. The existence of most physical and
administrative controls can be determined via visual
inspection. For controls internal to the computer,
testing is needed .... _he intent is to _imply verify that
the functions exist.
Test for control existence determination are
straight-forward. In many cases, a short operational
demonstration suffices. For example, the existence of a
passwozJ function can be determined by attempting to use
the application and verifying that a valid password is
required.
Methodology Review. Even though this is a high-level
overview-type evalu_tlon, it is still desiralle to Fain
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someassura_ce that controls are acceptably implemented.
The best way to do this without becoming immersed in
testing or detailed analysis is to examine the methodology
used to develop the application.
The areas of concern in reviewing a development
methodology for cart'S,cation are summarized below.
i. Documentation. Is there current, complete and
acceptable-quaAity documentation?
, Objectives. Was security explicitly stated and
treated as an objective, with an appropriate amount
of emphasis for the situation? Were security
requirements defined?
. Project Control. Was development weli-controlled?
Weru independent review and testing performed and
did they consider security? Was an effective
change control program used?
Tools and Techniques. Were structure design
techniques used (e.g., modularization_ formal
specifications)? Were established prcgramming
practices and standards used (e.g., high order
languages, structured walk-throughs)?
o Resources. Hcw experienced in security were the
people who developed the application? What were
the sensitivity levels or clearances associated
with their positions?
Detailed evaluations involve analysis of the quality of
security safeguards. Primary tasks are examinations of
the application from three poicts of view:
i. Functional Operation (Do controls function
properly?)
2. Performance (Do controls satisfy performance
criteria?)
3. Penetration Resistence (How readily can controls be
broken or circumvented?)
Detailed evaluation consists of a collection of
approaches. Selection of which to use depends pr!marily
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on the threats and exposures of concern, rather than on
the general characteristics or overall sensitivity of the
application. To illustrate, if the primary c ,ncern is to
protect secrets from an external penetrator, penetration
resistance is stressed.
Functional Operation. Functional _Jperation is the point
of view most often emphasized in detailed evaluation since
it assesses protection against human errors and casL_l
attempts to misuse the application. Evaluations of
function cperatlon assess whether controls acceptably
perform their required functions. Although testing is the
primary technique in evaluating functional operation,
other validation and verification techniques must also be
used. particularly to provide adequate analysis and review
in esrly phases of the application llfe cycle° Testing
for functional operation examine areas such as the
following:
i. Control operation (e.g., do controls work?)
2. Parameter checking (e.g., are invalid or improbable
parameters detected and properly handled?)
t Common error conditions (e.g., are invalid or
out-of-sequence commands detected and properly
handled?)
, Control monitoring (e.g., are security events such
as errors and file accesses properly recorded; are
performance measurement of characteristics such as
resource utilization and response time properly
recorded?)
5. Control management (e.g., do security procedures
for changing the security table work?)
To illustrate this testing, consider several of the tests
needed to examine control operation of a password function:
i. Test whether access without a password is
disallowed.
,
o
Test whether valid passwords are accepted and
invalid passwords are rejected.
...Test the interface between the password function
and the access authorization function by testing
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whether access is properly allowed or disallowed.
For example, verify that valid passwords allow
proper access and do Ll_'tallow improper access, and
that invalid passwords result in proper access
restriction.
4. Test whether the system responds correctly to
multiple invalid passwords.
5. Test whether system-initlated reauthenticatlon
functions correctly.
Functional operation includes the application's resistance
tc external errors. Therefore the t_st areas of primary
ihterest include those Interfaces across which errors
might propagate:
i. man-man (e.g., operator messages)
2. man-system (e.g., commands, procedures)
3. system-system (e.g., intersystem dialogue)
4. process-system (e.g., calls)
3. process-process (e.g., Interprocess calls)
Besides testing, there are other security evaluation tools
and techniques that can be of use in examining functional
operations. For example, software tools for program
analysis, can be helpful in documentation analysis.
Matrices can suggest ideas for test cases and scenarios.
Checklists have utility in provldlug quick training as
well as suggesting ideas for tests.
Formal verification is a technique that may be used during
a detailed evaluation. Formal verification offers the
hope of being able to mathematJcally "prove" that a
functional design abides by a few simple security rules,
and that lower levels of abstraction are consistent with
the proven higher-level design performance. A number of
qualitative factors are listed under the general heading
of performance, which is the second area of concern in
detailed evaluation. These are availability,
survl_abillty, accuracy, response time, and throughput.
They can be applied to either individual controls or
entire applications.
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i. Availability. W_t proportion of time is the
application available to perform critical or full
services: Availability incorporates many aspects
of reliability, redundancy, and maintainability.
It is often more important than accuracy. It is
especially relevant to applications with denial of
service exposures as primary concerns (e.g., air
traffic control, automatic funds disbursement,
production control). Security controls usually
require higher availability than other portioss of
an application.
. Survivability. How well does the application or
control wlthstand major failures or natural
disasters? "Withstand" includes the support of
emergency operations afterwards, and recovery
actions to return to normal operation.
J Accuracy. How accurate is the application or
control? Accuracy encompasses the number,
frequency and significance of errors. Controls for
which accuracy measures are especially applicable
are identity veriflcatlo_ t_cnniques and
communication llne handling techniques.
, &esponse Time. Are response times acceptable?
Slow control response time can entice users to
bypass the controls. Examples of controls for
which response time is critical are passwords
(especially i distributed networks) and identity
verification techniques.
. Throughput. Does the application or control
support required usage capacities? Capacity
includes the peak and average loading of such
things as users and service requests.
Penetration Resistance. The task here is to assess
resistance against the breaking or circumventing of
controls, where resistance is the extent to which the
application and controls must block or delay attacks.
Assessment of penetration resistance can be the most
technically complex of _he detailed evaluation
categories. It is best done to establish confidence in
security safeguards. It can also be done to find and fix
flaws. In both cases it:
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i. provides an assessment of an application's
penetration resistance;
2. helps to determine the difficulties involved in
actually exploiting flaws; and
. provides a clear demonstration of flaw
exploltability (since it might not be clear from
analyois whether, say, an asynchronous timing flaw
can be exploited).
The objective of penetration-reslstance evaluation is to
identify externally exploitable flaws in internal security
functions and the interfaces to them. Following are
illustrative areas for this detailed examination:
I. complex interfaces
2. change control process
3. limits and prohibitions
4. error handling
5. side effects
6. dependencies
7. design modlflcatlons/extenslons
8. control on security descriptors
9. execution chain of security services
i0. access to residual information
Additional information on these areas can be found in the
IBM Systems Journal paper entitled: "Penetrating am
Operating System: A Study of VM/370 integrity" ;19].
The finalization of the test procedures will be a
simultaneous activity by the test team while systLm
developers are writing the security code and documenting
the security safeguards.
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2.3.1.9 Write Security Relevant Code
_ne precise way in which security safeguards will actually
be implemented in the software code will depend to a great
extent on the programming language used, installation
standards, and personal programming style. '_Ithln the
foregoing limitations there are some practices that should
be followed to ensure that security relevant code is
understandable audltable, maiutalnable and testable.
The System Auditabillty and Control (SAC) Study [3] in
discussing application system development controls
provides some guidance that is useful to the development
of security relevant code,
The adequacy and effectiveness of controls
included in computer application systems are
affected by the methods and procedures used during
the system development process.
One of the areas discussed in some depth is the use of
structured programming. The following is a summary of the SAC
discussion of structured programming.
The objective in using structured programming
techniques is to develop more usable and effective
programs. "Usable" implies that the program can
be read and understood by technical persons who
did not write it, including users and EDP
auditors. "Effective" implies that the program is
designed to fit into an overall application system
scheme so as to reduce redundancy and ensure
processing efficiency.*
Structured programming is a technique for system
builders that renders systems easier to build,
maintain and alter. It is a discipline that is
used primarily in the detail design and
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prograau_ng states of the development process. As
such, it uses a stepwlse top-down approach, in
which program modules are organized by functional
specifications into a balanced hierarchical
structure with minimum side effects on each module.
Structured progra=_'ng involves a team approach to
_etailed design, with team members being used to
"walk-through" the design and coding of
components. The effec_ is that the design and
code can be viewed by other than the originator to
detect faulty logic, hard-to-follow code and the
extent to which the design meets prespeclfled
o)Jectlves.
Stanford Research Institute, authors of the SAC study, found
the following major techniques were used by many organizations:
Program Structure. A semlstrlct program structure
allowing GO TO statements in a downward direction
within a section domain.
Statement For_attlng. Fixed column indentation
for both processor division and data division
sections; in addition, a maximum of one verb per
line a_d specific columns for operators.
Peer Reviews. Structured walk-throughs whereby at
least two peers completely trace or walk through
the code generated by another programmer.
Team Organization. The establishment of an
integrated team consi_tlng of one project
leader/analyst, two programmer analysts, one to
three programmers and one programmer librarian.
Security controls should meet the usable objective. To be
effective, in the above context, security controls should
not unnecessarily reduce processing efficiency and be
implemented in a way that they are part of the overall
application scheme, and do not appear or operate as an
interruption to the normal flow of the program or
application processes.
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• Top-Down Design. This technique consists of
designing program loglc by specifying higher level
functions flrst and determining the subfunctlons
required to implement these higher level functions.
• Segmentation. During detail design and
programmng, it is advantageous to keep programs
and modules in the form of routines called
segments, with each segment having but one entry
and exit.*
Structured Coding. This approach or discipline is
used to depict the process of coding whereby there
are conventions used for syntax, program format,
restricted and controlled branching, and
disciplines on logic.
• Walk-throughs. The walk-through consists of a
planned review of all system specifications and
coding by peers of the developers. Walk-throughs
have been found to be instrumental in uncovering a
majority of errors during the pre-installation and
test phases of a system. It is usually worthwhile
to ellow others to review specifications and code
before a Joint meeting. The review meeting can
then become mainly a question answering and
resolution session.
Programmer Librarian. The programmer librarian
actually serves the purpose of documenting all
source codes. This functloD is responsible for
getting codes keyed, updating the source library,
and other general program documentation.
FIPS PUB 73 t2] recommends the following practices to
enhance the security of application systems:
Program Libraries. The program library catalogs and
controls access to all %erslons of program modules as
they are being developed. These control functions can
* The segmentation technique is particularly applicable to the
coding of security relevant code.
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be carried out by either manual or aatomated means.
The program library can provide the following types of
security controls during the programming stage:
* permlt only authorized persons access to program
modules,
* record all accesses (especially modifications) to
program modules,
associate control data, such as record and byte
counts, with program modules to facilitate detection
of changes, and
enable comparison of current versions of modules
with previous versions to identify code that has
been changed.
More rigorous controls are needed as the program modules near
completion, especially once review and testing has begun.
S
Redundant Computation. Critical computations can be
checked by redundant processing to verify correctness
of the result. Examples of local redundancy checks
include:
* recalculation of a critical result by an alternate
method;
* checking a calculated result for reasonableness and
consistency with other data items; and
* examining extra attributes in retrieved data to
ensure that the data item found was the one that was
searched for.
Program Development Tools. The choice of the
programming language and of other programming tools can
enhance the reliability and correctness of the final
products. Proper selection and utilization of such
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tcols will help prevent programming errors from
ent_rlng the source code. Some specific program
development tools include:
High Level Programming Languages. Programming
languages are especially useful if they support
structured control flow, extensive data deflnltlon
facilities, strong type checking, restricted scopes
for program varlables, and well-deflned module
calllng con_utions. Compilers for such languages
can do extensive checking to identify program errors.
Preprocessors. Many of the advantages of hlgh-level
programming languages can be accomplished through a
preprocessor. A preprocessor can be used to:
eliminate some of the more restrictive conditions
in an existing language (e.g., allow structured
flow in FORTRAN programs), and
provide automated quality control by cl cking
that program modules meet the coding standards of
this project.
Other Tools. Program development tools such as
those that reformat source code, produce
cross-reference listings and aid debugging are
useful to help programmers manage the
complexities.
2.3.1.10 Document Security Safe_uard___ss
Program documentation is needed during any software
development; Jt is especially necessary for securlty-relevant
code. FIPS PUB 73 [2] defines security-relevant code as:
• code that implements security controls;
• code that performs critical processing (e.g., check
disbursement, real-tlme controls); and
• code that has access te critical or sensitive data
during its execution.
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Brill [13] discusses the documentation of security controls as
follows:
You plan your controls; verify them through reviews
with users ana managempnt; verify the operability of
the controls through tests where you can; and make
whatever modifications are necessary to get the best
overall workable set of controls. Then make
sure--agaln by review and test--t_t your
documentation properly reflects the controls you want
and the way that you want them to work.
The SAC [3] study provides the following thoughts on
documentatlon that are applicable to the documentation of
security controls.
Documentation is the process of describing on paper what
functions an application system performs, hew it performs
them, and how the funct _ns are to be used. The
objectives of good docum_ tatlon are to provide
application system deslgnt s, implementers, testers, users
and EDP auditors with a clear means of understanding all
aspects of the application system.
Documentation...is importaut because it helps ensure
correct and efficient processing within both data
processing and user areas; it increases the ease and
accuracy of computer program maintenance, and it provides
auditors with an independent basis for cvaluating
application control.
One approach to documentation is used by a large focd
manufacturer. This organization makes use of a
documentation test to be administered throughout the
phases of system development. The primary put,use is to
ensure that appropriate documentation exists for the major
phases of system development;...
In addition to verifying the existence of sufficient
documentation, this technique also assesses various
aspects of the documentation, including the following:
- Does the documentation give evidence that processing
controls will be adequate?
z-62
_ave sufficient controls been built into tt,c system to
allow effective operatlon and maintenance?
Can the documentation be used ae a basis to prove that
controls over operation and maintenance are adequate?
It is recommended that the documentation of security-relevant
code be contained in an independent document. The sensitivity
of seccrity-relev_nt code is such that it should be
well-protected and access to the documentation should be
restricLed.
2.3.1.11 Conduct Security Test and Evaluation
Ideally, the conduct of the actual security test and evaluation
will be performed by an organization independent of the system
developers and users; that is, an independent validation and
verification (IV&V) team, quality assurance personnel or an
audit group. If such groups do not for_ally exist within the
organizatio.1, a team of security evaluators may be formed for
the purpose of conducting the security test and evaluation.
Tean skills that will be required include application analysts,
testers, programmers, penetration specialists, W&T specialists
and security.
_te actual test will consists of some combination of the
following: document reviews, interJiews, dynamic tests and
penetration resistance tests. Each of these have been
previously discussed.
Regardless of what combination of tests is used, it is
i_portant that the test team keep a llst of documents reviewed,
document all interviews, and document snd maintain the results
of any tests run against the application.
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2.3o1.12 Write Security Teat and Evaluation Report
The purpose of the Security Test aLd Evaluation Report is to
document the test and evaluation results and ft_dlngs; present
the demonstrated capabilities ans deficiencies of the security
controls; and provlde a basis for preparing the proposed
security certification report.
The Security Test and Evaluation Report should be prepared by,
or under the direction of, the security team leader. It wlll
then be transmitted to the application computer aecurity
official (CS0). FIPS TUB 103 [8], provides a sample outline
that can be used to develop the Security Test and Evsluation
Re_9rt (see Figure 2-7). As noted in Figure 2-8, the sample
outline contains flve aectlons. Section i, Introduction and
Summary, briefly describes _he application and summarizes the
evaluation findings and recommendations. Section 2,
Background, provides contextual informatlon for the Application
CSO including the security standards and policies .hat were
applied. Also, it should include a llst of the general
functional characteristics of the application that generally
influence its certiflability (e.g., tile absence or presence of
user programming). The scope of the evaluation and the
assumptions and constraints on the test should be Jdentlfied.
Section 3, Major Findings, should summarize the controls in
place and their _ole in protecting tie data and/or the
appllcation. It should empLhasize those controls that were
found to be effective. Any vulnerabilities found during the
test should al_o be documented. ]he report should identify
those vulnerabillties whJeh should be accepted aud those which
should be corrected.
2-6t_
l,
Z.
3.
,
5.
Attachment A_
TN-TRODSCTJON AND S_4MARY
BACKGROUND
MAJOR FINDINGS
3.1 General Control Posture
3.2 Vulnera:illties
RECOMMENDED CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
EVaLUaTION PROCESS
Proposed CertlficatJon Statement
F=GURE 2-7
SAMPLE OUTLINE FOR A SECURITY EVALUATION REPORT
265
Section 4, Recommended Corrective Actions, identifies what
additional controls should be considered and the anticipated
costa of such recommendations. Section 5, Evaluation Process,
should summarize the security test and evaluation process So
include the types of tests that were conducted.
2.3.1.13 Frepare the Proposed Certificatiou Statement
The proposed Certification Statement should summarize the
recommendations, the acceptability cf applications' security
safeguards, restrictions (e.g., applications must be run as a
stand-a1,_ system), and/or corrective actions that must be
accompl_k-'_,i prior to allowing the application to commence
running
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3. SOFTWARE (_UALITY ASSURANCE AND SECURITY
G. H. Myers, in Software Reliability, Principles and Practices
[4], begins a discussion of the definition of software
reliability as follows:
l_e most significant problem facing the data
processing business today is the software problem
that is marifested in two major complaints; software
is too expensive and software is unreliable. Most
computer professionals recognize the former problem
as largely a symptom of the latter ....
It is Interesting to note that the software
reliability problem as it exists today was observed
in the early days of computing:
Those who regularly code for fast electronic
computers wil ' have learned from bitter experience
that a large rractlon of the time spent in
preparing ca culations for the machine is taken up
in removing blunders that have been made in
drawing up the programs. With the aid of common
sense and checking subroutines, the majority
mistakes are quickly found and rectified. Some
errors, however, are sufficiently obscure to
escape detection for a surprisingly long time [20].
This observation was published by three British
mathematicians in 1952. Although software errors
were encountered before 1952, this seems to be the
first recognition of the reliability problem, that
is, a considerable amount of time is required for
testing, and, even after this, some software errors
will remain undetected.
The immediate problem encountered in dealing with
software reliability is one of the definition: What
is a software error? What is software reliability?
Myers provides the following definition:
A software error is present when the software does
not do what the user reasonably expects it to do. A
_oftware failure is an occurrence of a software error.
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Software reliability is the probablllty that the
software will execute for a particular period of time
without failure, weighted by the cost to the user of
each failure encountered.
Oneof the areas of software where errors can be least
tolerated is that of security safeguards. One of the
techniques that is currently being employed to improve the
reliability of software is software quality assurance. This
section provides a discussion of uoftware quality assurance,
the software quality assurance llfe cycle, and how software
quality assurance can be employed to reduce the potential for
incorporating unreliable security safeguards in application
systems.
3.1 The Cost of Software Errors
Sorkowitz [14] indicates that to better manage the development
and maintenance of ADP systems, it is important to have an
understanding of how software _'osts are distributed throughout
the total software llfe cycle. Sorkowltz provides the
following:
Life cycle costs are documented as follows:
a. Initiation Phase
Very little research has been done in this area.
b. Deve_)pment Phase
A number of independent studies [21] divide the
development costs as follows:
i. analysis and deslgn--40%
2. coding and unit testlng--20%
3. system test and integratlon--20%
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The above figures have sometimes been described in
the literature as the 40-20-20 rule.
Testln8
Studies have shown that the various testing phases
can account for up to 50_ of the total resources
spent for the development of a software system.
In discussing _he detection of errors, Sorkowltz indicates that:
The phase in the life in which errors are detected is
very important. This may sound obvious, but there
are severe penalties if this simple point is not well
understood. The cost of ccrrectlng an error
increases with time.
Myers [4] shows two relatJonships concerning error correction
versus schedule times (Figure 3-i). The first relationship
shows that the cost of correcting an error increases rapidly
during the latter parts of the development cycle. However, a
second and less-known relationship also follows the same
general curve. The probability of fixing a known error
incorrectly also increases rapidly during the latter stages.
In the first relatloeshlp, Wolverton and Putnam [21] noted that
a requirement error detected in the design stage is 2-1/2 times
more costly to fix than if detected in the requirement stage.
This same error detected in the Unit test stage is five times
more costly and if found during integration testing is 36 times
more costly. If we consider the very special case of a
security safeguard that is embedded in the software cnd that
safeguard contains an error, we can see that the ultimate
potential cost can increase dramatically (Figure 3-2).
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Not only will the organization incur the cost to fix the flawed
software, but in addition, could incur a loss whlch may well
exceed the cost to fix the flaw.
From the security perspective, the concern then is how do we
ensure that the safeguards that are incorporated into
application's software are free from errors and are reliable.
From the system designer's and system developer's perspective,
the concern is how do we define, design and develop error-free
and reliable safeguards. In other words, how do we define and
develop quality safeguards? One of the techniques is the use
of a quality assurance process or function.
3.2 Software _uality Assurance
Perry, in Effective Methods of EDP Quality Assurance [22],
provides some introductory comments on quality assurance that
are appropriate to this d_scussion.
Organizations continually quest for quality
products. Organizations that achieve a high level of
quality in their products first establish an
acceptable level of quality and then build a
mechanism that assures this level is maintained.
That mechanJsm in manufacturing ls known as quality
control .... Quality control includes more than an
evaluation of the end product. It begins with the
examination of the raw materials and continues
throughout the manufacturing cycle.
Data processing organizations must equate _heir
function to manufacturing a product in order to see
the need for a quality control function. Data
processing must assume the responsibility of
determining an acceptable level of quality, and then
establish the mechanism (e.g., quality assurance
function) to assure that level is maintained.
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...the quality assurance function is an evolutionary
step along the path of moving data processing from an
art to a science.
One of the questions that comes to mind in any initial
discussion of software quality assurance is: What is quality?
Perry provides the following thoughts:
Quality is defined iu the dictionary as an attribute
or characteristic that is associated with something.
Thus quality cannot be universally defined, but
rather, must be defined for the item in question.
Quality becomes a stated list of attributes and
characteristics.
3.2.1 Software _uality Factors
To improve the quali_y of software, it is important to have an
understanding of the attributes and characteristics, sometimes
referred to as factors, that contribute to software quality.
Sorkowitz [23] provides the following list of software quality
factors.
Correctness - the extent to w_ich a program
satisfies its specifications and fulfills the
user's mission o_Jectives.
• Reliability - the extent to which a program can be
expected to perform its intended function with
required precision.
s Efficiency - the amount of computing resources and
code required by a program to perform a function.
• Integrity - 'he extent to which access to software
or data by unauthorized persons can be controlled.
• Usability - the effort required to learn, operate,
prepare input, and interpret output of a program.
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• _llntalnabillty - the effort required to locate
and fix an error in an operational program.
Testability - the effort required to test a
program to ensure it performs its intended
function.
• Flexibility - the effort required to modify an
operational program.
Portability - the effort required to transfer a
program from one hardware configuration and/or
software system envlroument to another.
s Reusability - the extent to which a program can be
used in other appllcations--related to the
packaging e'_ scope of functions that programs
perform.
• Inceroperabllity - the effort requlxed to couple
one system with another.
3,2,2 Software _uallty Factors and the Life Cycle
The points in the system development llfe cycle where each of
the factors is of concern is illustrated in Figure 3-3.
Figure 3-4 [23] identifies the relationship of software quality
factors to the llfe cycle phases in terms of where quality
factors should be measured and where the impact of poor quality
is realized. It should be noted that software quality factors
should be included in the functional requirements document and
ultimately viewed as performance criteria.
3.3 The Software Quality Assurance Process
The purpose of employing a software quality assurance process
is to improve computer software products that are produced via
the software development process. Software quality assurance
activities should be accomplished at pertinent points during
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the system development llfe cycle. Also, procedures should be
established to control and track changes generated during the
development cycle. Software quality assurance involves the use
of various reviews and the establishment of baselines
throughout the development cycle. The reviews and baselines
are depicted in Figure 3-5.
3.3.1 Software quality Assurance Baselines
The chsractezistics of an evolving system and its configuration
items are defined and documented in increasing detail at
logical transition points, or baselines, in the system
development llfe cycle. At any time in the llfe cycle, all of
the previously established baselines, together with approved
changes to these baselines, constitutes the identification of
the system and its configuration items. Five baselines are
usually defined in the software assurance life cycle:
functional, allocated, developmental, product and operational.
Fuoctiona7 Basellnc - marks the end of _he initiation
phase and the start of the definition stage of the
developmel_t phase.
• Allocated Baseline - marks the end of the design stage
and the start of the programming stage and is
established by the detailed design specifications.
Developmental Baseline - marks the end of the
programming stage a_i the start of the test phase.
Product Baseline - marks the end of the test stage and
the ntart of the operations phase.
• Ope_atlonal Baseline - marks the end of the
implementation stage and the start of the maintenance
phase and is established by the satisfactory
demonstration of the application system in the
operational environment.
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3.3.2 Reviews snd Audits
The various reviews and audits that should take place
throughout the system development llfe cycle iuclude the system
requirements review (SRR), system design review (SDR),
preliminary design review (PDR), critical design review (CRD),
test readiness review (TRR), functional configuration audit
(FCA), physical configuration audit (PCA), and formal
qualifica_'on review (FQR).
Systems Requirements Review (SRR) - _he objective of
this review is to ascertain the adequacy of the system
requirements. It should be conducted when a
significant portion of the syBtem functional
requirements have been established.
System Design Review (SDR) - this review should be
conducted to evaluate the optimization, correlation,
completeness and risks associated with the allocated
technical requirements. Also included is a summary
review of the system process _ich produced the
aJlocated technical requirements of of the p]annlng for
the next phase of the effort. This review should be
conducted wben the system definition effort has
proceeded to the point where system characteristics arc
defined.
• Preliminary Design Review (PDR) - this review should be
conducted for each system element to (i) evaluate the
progress, technical adequacy, and risk resolurlon (on a
technical, cost and schedule basis) of the _elected
design approach, (2) determine its compatabillty with
performance and requirements of the develcpment
specification, and (3) establish the existence and
compatibility of the physical and functional interfaces
among the other elements (personnel, equipment,
faciiitles and computer programs).
• Critical Design Review (CDR) - this review should be
conducted for each element when the detailed design is
esseetially complete. The purpose of this review is to
(i) determine that the detailed design of the elements
under review satisfies the performance requirements of
the development soeclflcations, (2) establish the
3-13
detailed design compatibility amongthe element•, (3)
assess the produclbillty and risk areas Con technical,
cost and schedule perspective), and (4) review the
preliminary product specifications.
s Test Readlnes• Review (TRR) - a formal review should be
conducted to validate the plan and the test procedure•
to include the test conditions, the extent of testing
and the criteria for acceptance.
Functional Configuration Audit (FCA) - a formal audit
should be conducted to validate that the development of
an element ha• been completed satisfactorily and that
the element has achieved the performance and functional
characteristic• specified in the functional and design
specifications.
• Physical Configuration Audit (PCA) - a technical
examlnatlopn of a designated element should be
conducted to verify that the element "as built"
conforms to the technical documentation which defines
tho element.
s Formal Qualification Revlew (FQR) - this review should
consist of a test, inspection or analytical process by
which products at the end item or critical end item
level are verified to have met specific requirements
(specifications or equivalent). This review does not
apply to requirements verified during the FCA.
Reviews and audits should be conducted by personnel or an
organizational entity independent of the development team.
3.4 Software Quality Assurance Life Cycle Security Activities
It is not sufficient to incorporate security safeguards in
appllcatlon systems. Safeguards should possess many of the
same characterlsclcs previously identified in the discussion of
software quality factnrs. Also, security concerns should be
integrated into the software quality assurance process in the
same manner that security concerns should be Incoporated into
the system development life cycle process.
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3.4.1 Security Safe§uard Characteristics (Factors)
Security safeguards should possess the following
characteristics: correctness, reliability, efficiency,
integrity, usability, maintainability, testabillty_ flexibility
and interoperabillty.
Correctness - the extent to which a security safeguard
satigfles its specifications and fulfills the
application security objectives.
• Reliability - the extent to which a security safeguard
can be expected to perform its intended function with
required precision.
Efficiency - the amount of computing resources and code
required by a security safeguard to perform its
function.
• Integrity - the extent to which access to the security
safeguard by unauthorized persons can be controlled.
• Usability - the effort required to learn, operate,
prepare input and interpret output from a security
safeguard.
• Maintainability - the effort required to locate and fix
an error in or to determine the impa_t of other system
changes on a security safeguard.
• Testability - the effort required to test or audit a
security safeguard to ensure that it performs Its
intended function.
• Flexibility - the effor; required to modify an
operation security safeguard.
Interoperabillty - the effort required to couple to or
integrate security safeguards into the application
system.
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3.4.2 Security Assurance Activities
The security activities that should be an integral part of the
software quality assurance process consist of a set of deflned
reviews and audits and approvals. The reviews and audits to be
accomplished throughout the software quality assurance life
cycle can be viewed as an integral part of the software quality
assurance process but are separately identifiable actions. The
security activities (Figure 3-6) to be completed in conjunction
with software quality assurance activities ares security
requirements review, security design review, security
speclflcatlon_ few, security test readiness review, and the
security test and evaluation review.
3.4.2.1 Security Requlrements Review
The objective of this review is to ascertain the adequacy of
the security objectives, security feasibility and the
preliminary security requirements. It should be conducted when
a significlant portion of the security requirements ha_e been
defined and In conjunction with the system requirements review
(SRR).
The security requirements should be reviewed and approved by
the application computer security official.
3.4.2.2 Security Design Review
This review should be conducted to eval_ate the completeness
and appropriateness of the technical security requirements.
The review should also evaluate the techvical risks of the
safeguards that are being considered to meet the security
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requirements. The review should be conducted when the security
definition effort has progressed to the point where the types
of security controls that are proposed for the system have been
identified and the initial or draft architectural security
specifications have been developed. The system process wblch
produced the architectural specifications should be reviewed.
This review should be conducted in conjunction with the
prellmlnary design review. The architectural specifications
should be approved by the application computer security
official.
3.4.2.3 Security Specifications Review
This review should be conducted for each security safeguard
when the detailed security specifications are essentially
complete. The purpose of the review is to (i) determine that
the detailed design of the safeguards under review satisfy the
performance requirements of the archltectural specifications,
(2) establish that the detailed design of the safeguards is
compatible with the application system detailed design, (3)
assess the produclbillty and risk areas (from a technlcal, cost
and schedule perspective), and (4) review the preliminary
security product specifications.
This review should be conducted in conjunction with the
crltical design review. The detailed design security
specifications should be approved by the application computer
security official.
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3.4.2.4 Security Test Readiness Review
The purpose of this review is to validate the security test
plan and test procedures to include the test conditions, the
extent of the security test and the criteria for acceptance.
The review should also determine the readiness of the security
controls for testing to ensure that the security test and
evaluation schedule can be met. The review should be conducted
in conjunction with the test readiness review. The test plan
and test procedures should be approved by the applications
computer security official.
3.4.2.5 Security Test and Evaluation Review
The purpose of the security test and evaluation review is to
evaluate the audltablllty of the records of the procedures, the
accuracy of the data resulting from the tests, and the
effectiveness of the tools and techniques used during the
test. A useful set of criteria evaluating the security test
and evaluation report is provided by FIPS PUB 102 [8] (Figure
3-7).
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Resource Queatlons
I. How much of resources (e.g., flue, money) were expanded in the
evaluatlon?
2. Who performed the evaluation? What are their qualifications?
Might there be any reasons to question their objectivity?
Process Questions
i. What technical review mechanisms were used?
2. Have t:,e flnd_ngs and recommendations been properly coordlnated7
3. What major tools and techniques were used? What other
_zperiencea have there been with them? Have resources been
effectively allocated to tools, analysis, and presentation of
findings?
Content Questions
i. Are the findings and rec_endatlons reasonable?
2, What are other a&eucles dolns In slnllar situations? Are
Federal and agency requirements applicable to this appllestlon?
Are there recent or proposed policy changes that are
applicable? Do agency needs override user needs? What are the
penalties for not complylnK with policies and requireuents?
3. Did the evaluation focus on the those thlnKs of primary
Importance? What assurances are there that major problen areas
have not b_en overlooked? Are there safeguards not considered
by the evaluation actlvity that might influence the flndlngs?
Are the recoumendatlons prlorltlzed? What was the basis for
prlorltization?
4. Many residual vulnerabilltle8 will exist. Have they been
identified?
5. Are rec_endatlons and Judpent8 supported? Is the quality of
supportlng data shorn7
FIGURE 3-7
CRITERIA FOR ASSESSING SECURITY EVALUATION REPORTS
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4. SAFEGUARD VISIBILITY
Most application systems manage and control valuable assets
(i.e, financial data, data about people, data on phy;_tcal goods
or other management or technical information). The need for
comprehensive, cost-effective controls or safeguards ls
generally obvious. Applications traditionally get controls by
chance, by user insistence, by auditor Involvement or by system
developer's recognition of the problem. Brlll [13] has found:
As an auditor, I sometimes encounter systems that
have pretty good controls even though not one of the
systems developers ever thought about them. The
controls somehow evolved.
Brlll has also observed that some people assume that controls
are different from everything else in the system, and that they
stand out llke a proverbial sore thumb. On the other hand,
some people have clalmed that controls aren't different; they
are part of the solution to the user's problem and Just mingle
in wlth other systems requirements.
Brlll's observations raise some interesting questlons about how
vlsable or identifiable security controls should be in the code
(particularly the source code) and the documentation of an
application system. Thls notion of visibility ls driven by the
needs of the application owner, system designers, system
developers, syEtem maintainers, operators, users, data
providers, data custodians, auditors, and last, but by no means
least, the need to protect the application and Its data from
the potential perpetrator. The requirements for vlslbllity of
safeguards is depicted in Figure 4-1.
4-2
4.1 The Needs of th_ Application Owner
For systems in development, the application owner has
responsibility for identifying the sensitivity of the
application and data, the security objectives, assessing the
security risks, participating in the security feasibility
analysis, and assisting in defining the security requirements.
Application owners need to be able to see the articulation of
the security concerns in a very vlaable sense. Once the system
is developed, the owner needs to be assured that all other
persona who use or have access to the system are properly
controlled. Therefore, the application owner needs to be able
to see that security concerns are sufficiently visible in the
user manuals in order to discharge their responsibility for
controlling access, modification, use and publication of
specific data elements within an application. The owner must
also have some way of assuring that they can properly discharge
their responsibility relative to special handling and
disposition of output products, and other administrative
controls over the functional user. Functional users who
interact and use the application in the discharge of their
duties do not want security safeguards to be highly visible
when the application is in operational use. The concern is
that if security is too visible and users perceive that
security will constrain them or unnecessarily or interfere with
their use of the syste_, the users will attempt to find ways to
bypass security or dilute the effectiveness of security (e.g.,
sharing of passwords).
4.2 The Needs of Systems Designers
System planners and designers have responsibility for
developing the security requirements and specifications in
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concert with the user based upon the security objectives. As
in the case of the application owners, planners and designers
need a clear and very visible articulation of the security
safeguards in the documents they help to produce.
4.3 The Needs of Systems Developers
Systems developers (programmers) will need a clear
understanding of the security requirements and specifications
in order to develop the software source code. The
security-relevant source code needs to be very identlfable for
those who will be involved in the review (e.g., structured
walkthrougns) of the code.
_.4 The Needs of System Maintainers
The personnel who w_ll be responsible for maintaining the
software over the operational llfe of the application will, in
all l_kelihood, not be tht personnel who were involved in the
development of the software. The maintainers must have clear
and understandable source code and documentation (requirements
_nd s_eclflcatlons) to work with, so they can fully understand
the nature of changes required in the security safeguards or
the potential impact of other software changes that may affect
the security safeguards.
4.5 The Needs of Computer Operators
The computer operators who will be involved in the actual
operation of the application software need little or no
understanding of how safeguards in the software actually work.
Rather, they need only enough instruction in the operator's
manual to be able to respond to and report security violations.
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4.6 Tne Needs of Data Users
Data users may be required to participate in the identifJcation
of sensitive data, security lequirements and back-up
requirements. Their need for visibility will vary throughout
the system development llfe cycle from high during the
requirements definition phase to low in the operations phase,
The articulation of the security controls in user documentation
must be sufficiently identifiable and understandable so that
user's management can be assured that their data is properly
protected. However, the visibility of the security controls
during the operation of the application should not be so
visible that user's perceive that they are being unduly
restricted or constrained in the ability to have access to the
application and their data.
4.7 The Needs of Data Providers
Data providers are organizations that provide data to the
application in order that the application an achieve its
intended purpose. Data providers need only a basic knowledge
about the requirements for security controls as It affects
protecting data during the inputting operation of the
application,
4.8 _he Needs of Data Custodians
Data custodians are organizations or organizational elements
that are responsible for naintalnlng the security and integrity
of data and software while it is under the control of that
organization. Data custodians must have a thorough
understanding of the safeguards employed to protect data while
it is in their custody.
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4.9 The Needs of Auditors
Auditocs are responsible for reviewing the adequacy of computer
security programs, lhe adequacy of internal controls
incorporated In applications systems and may be involved in the
development of application software to ensure that the
application i_ audltable once it is in operation. The auditors
needs for visibility cf _afeguards is high throughout every
activity connected with the llfe of an application.
4.10 The Needs for Protection A_alnst Potential Perpetrators
Since the objective of potential perpetrators is to affect
personal galn In the form of money or informatlcn, information
about how safeguards are designed and implemented in the code
should be protected from the potential perpet[ator. The one
area where safeguards should be highly visible to the
perpetrator aze in the actual operation of the application.
Systems which have good _ecurity controls that are visible to
the unauthorized user and the authorized user who might attempt
to use the system in an unauthorized maD_er tend to discourage
attempts t_ abuse or misuse the system.
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5. SECURITY SAFEGUARDS IN PACKAGED SOFTWARE
NASA, like most organizations, does not rely solely upon
inte._nally or contractor-developed applicatio_. The recent
advances in technology have made micro and personal computers a
viable solution for _ny of NASA's data processing needs.
Along with the acquisition of micro and personal computers has
come a number of software packages that have substantially
decreased the time from identification of a problem unt_l
implementation of a computer-based solution. Unfortunately,
not enough attention has been given to the problems inherent in
applylng a generallzed appllcatlon design to a specific
organization's unique set of objectives and constraints. Bloom
and Schneider [25] refer to part of the problem as the "package
trap.'
The "package trap" is the idea that a package itself
solves the business problem. Its greatest danger is
that once an application has been identified as
amenable to a package-based solutlon, too little
emphasle will be put on the analysis of the business
problems that dictate the need for the system.
Bloom and Schneider [25] also observed:
Adaptations must be made to the systems development
life cycle to facilitate a package-based solution.
McMenemy [26] points out another major concern wlth software
packages:
S,_ftware packages are sold as a fast and easy
,iternatlve to In-house development. That impression
is aided by clalms of software vendors that their
packages can be Installed and running in three days.
For your own protection, you must clarify the
important difference between "installed" and
"_ mplemer, ted."
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"Installed" means that the software programs wlll
reside on your computer, awaiting the information to
make them functioning systems.
In other words, the programming and debugging are
done. "I_plemented" means that all information is
loaded, all necessary interfaces have been programmed
and tested, all systems and user personnel are
competent in ope_atlng the system, all documentation
is completed and the system has paralleled the old
s) "tem, all documentation is completed and the system
has paralleled the old system to prove the validity
of the functions and information.
As you can see, the terms are very different in their
definition, and more importantly, in their impact on
the purchaser. Therefore, it should be better to
think of a software package as a means of eliminating
only the time spent on initial system design and
progrommlng, remembering that mass amounts of
information must still be entered into the system.
As McHenemy [26] points out, acquiring packaged software
eliminates only the systems design and programming stages of
the classic systems development llfe cycle. The Initiation
Phase, the Definition and Testing Stages of the Development
Phase, and the Implementation Stage of the Operations Phase of
the system development llfe cycle should still be completed.
5.1 System Development Life Cycle Activities for
Packaged Software
Schick [27] indicates that the steps involved in selecting
specific software packages vary with each situation, but a
general procedure is applicable in almost all cases. Schlck
advised that the steps to be followed in selecting software
packages include:
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Classlfyln_ Needs. If the computer must accomodate
several different applications, decide which
application is most important and choose the software
for it first. Then check to see what good software
is available to handle the less important
applications o, the same computer. If two or more
applications have equal priority, you may have to
compromise by selecting software to handle both
applications adequately.
It is also useful to decide how essential the
requirements are. Requirements may be categorized as
fixed, flexible, and optional. A fixed requirement
means that certain functions must be perfnrmed is a
specific way.
After defining and classifying requiremen_:_, write
them down so that they can serve as guide in
evaluating software packages.
Make a Requirements Chart. You can make a
requirements chart by using the specificati,ms
already developed, paying particular atteution to
fixed requirements. The result of this step will be
a uniform means of evaluating products.
Deflne Software Capacity. The amount of data you
expect the software to handle needs to be added to
the requirements chart. Software capacity limits are
set by the software author to ensure that the program
can run in the memory available on the computer
configuration for which it was designed. The present
and anticipated data capacity for the next year or
two should be estimated, and these numbers added to
the requirements chart.
Locate the Packages. Identify software products that
meet, or come close to meeting, the requirements.
Read product reviews in computer magazines, scan
product advertisements in trade periodicals, visit
local computer dealers, contact your industry or
trade association, talk to associates who have bought
computer software for requirements similar to yours
or call your accounting firm, Another source of
information is published directories of software.
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Rank the Products. This based on a tabulation of how
closely the products meet the requirements. To be
sure that the software is rlght for your buslnes•:
Purchase or borrow the manual, and read it to
understand the capabillties and limltation• of
the software
• Attend a demonstration of the software, - if
possible using some of your own data
Consider whether the people who will use the
software can follow the instructions provided
or will require special training
One area of critical importance in considering a package_
software solution :_s the potential for some customizing. For
example, now can a package be modified to accommodate a
function outside the package's scope such as security? Bloom
and Schneider [25] offer some advlce on the subject of
modification.
Even beyond the consideration of package
modlfi_catlons in the near term, it is important to
look at the package as the basis of future system
enhancements. The user must understand what
functionality the system will support immediately and
what functions the system m_ly be modified to support
in the future. The user muEtt also recognize that the
relatlve dlfflculty of accommodating new features
will depend heavily on the package's terhnical
architecture.
One significant opportunity presented by a
package-based implementation is the ability to _et
some software up almost immediately. The vendor'•
"vanilla" software should be installed as soon as
possible on the user's equlpm t. Once in place,
this baseline software can be med to perform a wide
array of functions, from modeling the production
environment for hardware and communications analyses
to prototypins user interfaces.
A corollary benefit of installing the package sooner
is that it can be tested sooner. Do not assume that
since a particular piece of software is in operation
at several sites it will not contain bugs or
undocumented features. A healthy dose of skepticism
pays dividends. Develop a set of representative test
data, and subject the "vanilla" package to thorough
testing.
When designing modifications and eDhancements to
software packages, there are a few subleties to keep
in mind. To achieve the true cost/beneflt of
package-based application, efforts should b_ made to
minimize the amount of modification. This approach
will frequently require the user to choose between
restructuring existing procedures to work with the
package and customizing the package ..... During the
system design phase, provision should be made for the
way in whtch future vendor releases wlll be
incorporated into the system.
Extensive testing is Just as necessary for
package-based appllcatlons for custom systems. While
the classic unit- or module-level test is not truly
applicable to unchanged portions of the software
package, it is appropriate for modules containing new
or modified code. Consequently, a test plan should
be developed during the system design phase which
addresses the moduler design of the new system as
well as the business function it is meant to serve.
It is crucial that the user participate heavily in
all phases of testing.
Structured walk-throughs are also a nece6sity; even
more so when they address modifications to the
package. These dcsign walk-throughs should include
not only the project development team, but also the
system's immediate users and those in the DP
organization who will be charged with maintaining the
new system.
As can be seen by the preceding advice of a number of experts,
the purchase, installation and Imple_entatlon of a software
package should follow the classlc systems development llfe
cycle, with the exception of the Design and Programming Stages
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(See Figure 5-1). When addressing the area of security, it is
important that the life cycle activities not be overlooked or
ignored.
5.2 Approaches for Addressln_ Securi_ in Software Packages
Software packages present a special concern when it co_es to
security. Since packages attempt to present a somewhat generic
solution for a large base of users, vendors have only a limited
perspective of the sensitivity of the data that will be
processed by their package once that package is installed and
implemented in the user's organization. The organization
considering the purchase of a packaged software product must
initially assume that the product will not be able to provide
an adequate and appropriate level of security, it is crucial
that the potential buyer accomplish most of the security
activities previously identified in Section 2.4 of these
guidelines, In particular, the following activities should be
accomplished:
• Determine the Sensitivity of the Data/Application
s Determine the Security Objective(s)
s Assess the Security Risks
• Conduct a Security Feasibility Study
• Define the Security Requirement•
• Evaluate the Security Features of the Package
• Develop the Security Test Plan
• Develop the Security Test Procedures
• Document the Security Safeguards
• Conduct the Security Test and Evaluation
• Write the Security Test Analysis Report
# Prepare the Security Certification Report
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The major difference in the activities identified above and the
security activities discussed in Section 2.4 is the evaluation
of security features of the package. To aid in the evaluation
of the package's security features, it might be helpful to
draft a set of architectural level specifications for
security. These specifications could then be used as a
"checklist" to determine if the package does provide the type
of security _afeguards required. If the package contains no
security gafequards or only partially satisfies the security
requirements and specifications, the potential buyer must look
to other alternatives for providing the requisite level of
protection. In large part, the alternatives will depend upon
the type of security not provided by the application. For
example, if the package does not provide for user
identification and validation, a stand-alone security package
deslgned especlally for the micro or personal computer that
will ultimately run the package should be considered, if such a
security package is available.
5t3 Security Assurance and Certification of Packaged Software
The one activity that has the greatest potential for being
overlooked when acquiring, installing and implementing a
software package is that of quality assurance. The concern for
software quality assurance, particularly with respect to the
security activities, is based on the fact that those who use
the application, in many cases, will be the ones who are
actually designing, evaluating and operating the package. When
systems are developed in-house from scratch, there is usually a
very formalized development and software quality assurance
process as described in Sections 2 and 3 of these guidelines.
Users who acquire, install and implement software packages that
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process sensitive data/applications are also required to have
those systems certified by an application computer security
official.
There is also concern for the integrity of the safeguards that
are implemented in conjunction with the software package. It
is, therefore, critical that some form of quality assurance be
performed durin& the pre-acquisition, acquisition, testing and
installation of a software package. Software package users
should review Section 3 of these guidelines and develop a
software quality assurance process at a level of detail
appropriate for their package. Speciflcally_ the following
reviews and approvals should be accompllshed:
• Security Requirements Review and Approval
• Security Design Review and Approval of the Inherent or
Added Security Features
• Security Test Readiness Review
• Security Test and Evaluation Plan Approval
• Security Test and Evaluation Review
• Security Safeguard Certification
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APPENDIX A
SAMPLE SECURITY TEST PLAN
i. GENERAL INFORMATION
.
i.i Summary. Summarize the security functions of the software
and the tests to be performed.
1.2 Environment and Pretest Background. Summarize the history
of the project. Identify the user organization and
computer center where the testing will be performed.
Describe any prior security testing and note results that
may affect this testing.
1.3 References. List appllcable references, such as:
_. Project request (authorization).
b. Previously published documents on the project.
c. Documentation concerning related projects.
d. FIPS publications and other reference documents.
PLAN
2.1 Software Description. Provide a chart and briefly describe
the inputs, outputs, and functions of the software being
tested as a frame of reference for the test descriptions.
2.2 Milestones. List the locations, milestones events, and
dates for the testing.
2.3 Testing (Identify Location). Identify the participating
organizations and the location where the software will be
tested.
2.3.1 Schedule. Show the detailed schedule of dates and
events for the testing at this location. Such
events may include familiarization, training, data,
as well as the volume and frequency of the input.
2.3.2 Requirements. State the resource requirements,
including:
a. Equipment. Show the expected period of use,
types, and quantities of the equipment needed.
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bo Software. List other software that will be
needed to support the testing that is not part
of the software to be tested.
2.3.3
Ca Personnel. List the numbers and skill types of
personnel that are expected to be available
during the test from both the user and
development groups. Include any special
requirements such as multl-shift operation or
key personnel.
Testing Materials. List the materials needed for
the test, such as:
a. Documentation.
b. Software to be tested and Its m_ium.
c. Test inputs and sample outputs.
d. Test control software and worksheets.
2.3.4 Test Training. Describe or reference the plan for
providing training in the use of the software being
tested. Specify the types of training, personnel to
be trained, and the training staff.
2.4 Testing (Identify Location). Describe the plan for the
second and subsequent locations where the software will be
tested in a manner similar to paragraph 2.3.
3. SECURITY SPECIFICATIONS AND EVALUATION:_
3.1 Specifications
3.1.1 Requirements. List the security functional
requirements established by earlier documentation.
3.1.2 Software Functions. List the detailed security
functions to be exercised during the overall test.
3.1.3 Test/Functlon Relationships. List the tests to be
performed on the software and relate them to the
functions in paragraph 3.1.2.
3.1.4 Test Progression. Describe the manner inwhich
progression is made from one test to another so that
the entire test cycle is completed.
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3.2 Hethods and Constraints.
3.2.1 Methodology. Describe the general method or
strategy of the testing.
3.2.2 Conditions Specify the type of Input to be used,
such as live or test data, as well as the volu_e and
frequency of the input.
3.2.3 Extent. Indicate the extent of the testing, such as
total or partial. Include any rationale for partial
testing.
3.2.4 Data Recording. Discuss the method to be used for
recording the test results and other information
about the testing.
3.2.5 Constraints. Indicate anticipated limi=ations on
the test due to test conditions, such as interfaces,
equipment, personnel, data bases.
3.3 Evaluation.
3.3.1 Criteria. Describe the rules to be used to evaluate
test results, such as range of data values used,
combinations of input types used, maximum number of
allowable interrupts or halts.
3.3.2 Data Reduction. Describe the techniques to be used
for manipulating the test data into a form suitable
for evaluation, such as manual or automated methods,
to allow comp "ison of the results that should be
produced to tose that are produced.
4. SECURITY TEST DESCRIPTIONS
4.1 Test (Identify). Describe the test to be performed.
4.1.1 Control. Describe the test control, such as manual,
semi-automatic, or automatic insertion of inputs,
sequencing of operations, and recording of results.
4.1.2 Inputs. Describe the input data and input commands
used during the test.
4.1.3 Outputs. Describe the output data ezpected as a
result of the test and any intermediate messages
that may be produced.
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4.2
4.1.4 Procedures. _;peclfy the step-by-step procedures to
accomplish the test. Include test setups
initialization, steps, and termination.
Test (Identify). Describe the second and subsequent tests
in a manner similar to that used in paragraph 4.1.
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